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INTERSTATE INTERCOURSE:
HOW MODERN ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
CHALLENGE THE TRADITIONAL REALM OF CONFLICTS OF
LAW
Sonia Bychkov Green*

"The realm of the conflict of laws is a dismal swamp, filled with
quaking quagmires, and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors
who theorize about mysterious matters in a strange and
incomprehensible jargon. The ordinary court, or lawyer, is quite lost
when engulfed and entangled in it."'
"The rise of these new technologies and therapeutic modalities,
including the use of third parties, to assist in creation or gestation of
an embryo has created a host of novel legal issues. The resolution of
these issues has caused confusion and contradictions in the 2
application of a body of existing statutory and common law.",
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INTRODUCTION
It is a Conflicts professor's dream hypothetical and a parent's worst
nightmare: a woman in one state gives birth to a baby with genetically linked
abnormalities after using sperm donated by a donor in a different state and after
having pre-implantation genetic diagnosis done by a specialist in a third state.
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Farfetched as this may sound, recent medical advances have made this possible.
Imagine in this scenario that the woman was unable to conceive and needed
donor sperm and the assistance of in vitro fertilization. Perhaps she was
concerned about a specific hereditary condition and consulted a nationally
prominent genetic specialist who analyzed cells from the embryos and advised
her reproductive endocrinologist which embryos to implant. After benefiting
from the reproductive technologies available, perhaps the mother discovered
after giving birth that her child actually had the genetic defect. This set of facts
sets up a potential "wrongful life" or "wrongful birth" suit, which is
controversial in and of itself, but facts can easily transform this into a more
complicated Conflicts problem. Imagine that the mother and the embryos are in
one state. The sperm donor is in another. The genetic specialist is in another.
Imagine further that the mother traveled from her state to see a reproductive
specialist in a fourth state, where the cells from the embryos were removed and
sent to the endocrinologist, but that the mother chose to bring suit in her own
state. To perfect the Conflicts conundrum that this creates, imagine the last
component: all the states have different laws about whether "wrongful life"
suits are allowed, have different standards for negligence suits against
reproductive specialists, and are missing any clear legislative guidance on some
of the trickier issues of regulation of sperm donors and genetic testing. Whose
law should apply?
The courts have cried out for decades for assistance in resolving simpler
issues.3 For most courts, the challenge has been the lack of laws in this area.4
The American Bar Association, passing a Model Act on assisted reproductive
technologies (hereinafter "ART"')in February 2008, described the challenge as
follows in a prefatory note:
Since the birth of the first in vitro fertilization (IVF) baby in 1978,
extraordinary advances in reproductive medicine have made
biological parenthood possible for people with infertility, certain
other medical conditions, for individuals who risk passing on
inheritable diseases or genetic abnormalities, or for individuals who
are effectively infertile due to social rather than medical reasons.
Such advances have also been applied to extend reproductive
potential by treating post-menopausal women. These advances use
technology to enable individuals to have children when for personal

3. See, e.g., Hodas v. Morin, 814 N.E.2d 320, 327 n.16 (Mass. 2004) ("As we stated in
Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr... and elsewhere, the Legislature is the most
appropriate forum to address issues raised by assistive technology in a comprehensive
fashion....").
4. See, e.g., Prato-Morrisonv. Doe, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509, 516 n.10 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002) ("We join the chorus of judicial voices pleading for legislative attention to the
increasing number of complex legal issues spawned by recent advances in the field of
assisted reproduction. Whatever merit there may be to a fact-driven case-by-case resolution
of each new issue, some over-all legislative guidelines would allow the participants to make
informed choices and the courts to strive for uniformity in their decisions.").
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reasons they cannot or choose not to do so by means of sexual
intercourse. These advances have also been used to retrieve gametes
from dead or incapacitated individuals, or to manipulate
differentiated cells to produce the equivalent or near-equivalent of a
human embryo, capable of implantation in the uterus and gestation to
term birth.5
New technologies, and ART in particular, always provide challenges to
established legal norms.6 Rules and tests may need to be rethought in order for
the law to address disputes that arise when such technology fails. Moreover,
choices-or the appearance of choices-made possible by reproductive
technologies will open the door to lawsuits because potential parents feel that
they have more control over the number, gender and genetic makeup of their
offspring. This article attempts to identify some of the potential problems, and
thus, lawsuits, that arise from the use of reproductive technology and to
propose some solutions.
This article is organized into four sections. The first section describes
ART in detail so that the reader understands the background to the potential
problems that may arise. The second section discusses possible problems,
lawsuits, and why these types of suits may be particularly problematic in a
multistate context. The third section describes current choice of law options and
how these might be and have been applied to ART lawsuits. The last section
proposes some solutions for resolving multistate ART lawsuits, including the
best choice of law approach, and how parties can protect themselves through
more proactive choices of law in contract formation.
It is every parent's nightmare that such lawsuits will arise. This means that
something has gone wrong, and when it comes to conception and reproduction,
the "something wrong" is likely to be serious. It is this mother's hope that such
lawsuits will not be needed and that procedures will be performed perfectly.
However, given the reality of imperfection and the fact that assisted
reproductive technologies are increasingly being applied across state lines, it is
at least this professor's dream that this article can help simplify the adjudication
of such suits and help lend some predictability to an area that is inherently
unpredictable. The goal of analysis is to help clarify a potentially confusing
situation and make the procedures and possible lawsuits less nightmarish for
parents and the courts, if a little bit less interesting for Conflicts professors.

5. Preface to MODEL ART ACT, supra note 2.

6. Widespread use of the internet, for example, has added new wrinkles to the laws of
personal jurisdiction, and trademark and copyright infringement, among others. See, e.g.,
Jeremy Gillman, PersonalJurisdiction and the Internet: Traditional Jurisprudencefor a

New Medium, 56 Bus. LAw. 395 (2000). Earlier, industrialization and multi-party
distribution chains led to the development of the products liability doctrine in tort law. See,
e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Products Liabilit., 76 YALE L.J. 887 (1967).
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PART ONE: THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LEGAL ISSUES THEY CREATE
I.

THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES: AN OVERVIEW OF ART

In order to understand the legal issues involved, it is helpful to have a
general background in ART procedures. It is important to note at the outset that
ART is not limited in any way to heterosexual married couples. Such use is still
frequent,7 but, increasingly, "nontraditional" couples or individuals seek to
create families through ART.8
The easiest way to discuss ART is to focus on the reasons for the
procedures. The first group of these reasons focuses on impaired fertility of one
or both members of the couple. In the case of heterosexual partners who find
themselves unable to conceive naturally, the first step toward ART is a
screening and workup of both partners. 9 This type of screening may inform the
physician whether the inability to conceive' ° is due to a female factor," a male
factor,12 a combination of both, or some unexplained reason. 3 In a case of a
single prospective parent, or a couple of the same gender, a workup is often
done as well, but often there 4is a clearer answer to what is necessary for the
person or couple to conceive.1
A. Egg Stimulation
In instances where the reason for the inability to conceive is because of
insufficient egg production by the female and in instances where a female
needs to have some extra stimulation to produce more than a normal number of
eggs,' 5 the physician will often try to stimulate the egg production itself.16 The

7. See generally Charles P. Kindregan, Thinking About the Law of Assisted
Reproductive Technology, 27 Wis. J. FAM. L. 123 (2007).
8. In fact, in North Coast Women's Care Medical Group, Inc. v. Superior Court, 81
Cal. Rptr. 3d 708, 712 (Cal. 2008), the California Supreme Court held that patients cannot be
denied access to ART because of their sexual orientation.
9. DANIEL KENIGSBERG WITH LAUREN HARTMAN, THE BABY SOLUTION: YOUR
ESSENTIAL RESOURCE FOR OVERCOMING INFERTILITY 30-53 (2006).
10. Or, for some couples, the inability to carry a fetus to term. SHERMAN J. SILBER,
HOW TO GET PREGNANT 357-77 (rev. ed. 2005).
11. Female factors can include ovarian cysts, diminished ovarian reserve, blocked or
damaged fallopian tubes, uterine fibroids and/or polyps, Asherman's syndrome (in which
scarring causes the uterine walls to become stuck together), and endometriosis. KENIGSBERG
& HARTMAN, supra note 9, at 83-130.
12. Male factors can include low or no sperm production (which may have a variety of
causes), retrograde ejaculation (in which semen does not exit the body), and varicoceles (in
which an obstruction of veinous drainage in the scrotum raises the temperature in the
scrotum and damages the sperm). Id. at 141-56.
13. See generally id. at 83-156.
14. See generally SUSAN WARHUS, FERTILITY DEMYSTIFIED 71-92 (2007).
15. For example, to save for an in vitro fertilization cycle.
16. All of this is described very generally for the purpose of this article. In some
females, a diagnosis might be made that an attempt to stimulate egg production will not
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least invasive method of assisted reproduction is the use of Clomiphene Citrate
("CC"). 7 This drug stimulates the production of eggs in a woman's ovaries. 8
This type of assisted reproduction is not usually classified as "assisted
reproductive technology" because it is more of a stimulating drug and does not
involve the manipulation of eggs or sperm in a lab.' 9
B. IntrauterineInsemination

Intrauterine insemination, which is sometimes done in conjunction with
egg production stimulation, and/or donor sperm, is a procedure in which a
doctor inserts washed and concentrated sperm directly into a woman's uterus to
coincide with the time that she is ovulating.20
C. In Vitro Fertilizationand Related Procedures

In vitro fertilization (IVF) is the most well known of the ART procedures
and the most successful treatment for most causes of infertility.2' IVF, which
was "born" in the late 1970s at a clinic in England,22 gained in popularity and
acceptance over the years. 23 Traditional IVF involved the removal of eggs from
a female,24 the production of sperm by the male, and the mixing of the eggs and
sperm in a culture dish prior to incubation and fertilization. Traditionally,
after two days, a fertilized egg or embryo-or, in some instances, several
embryos-were put back into the woman's uterus with the hope that it would
implant. 26 Because not all of the resultant embryos are necessarily transferred
and some may remain frozen at the laboratory or in a storage facility, there is
currently an important national debate about the proper or allowed uses of those
embryos.27 If initially unsuccessful, the IVF procedure may be repeated with
the frozen embryos.2 8

likely succeed because of low hormonal levels in certain areas, or for other health reasons.
See generally SILBER, supra note 10, at 99-118.
17. See generally DEBRA FULGHAM BRUCE & SAMUEL S. THATCHER, MAKING A BABY:
EVERYTHING You NEED TO KNOW TO GET PREGNANT 226-28 (2000). This drug is available
under the brand names Serophene, Milophene, and the most well known, Clomid. ld
18. Id. at 226.
19. Id.
20. See WARHUS, supra note 14, at 152.
21. SILBER, supra note 10, at 198.
22. Id. at 197.

23. See id. at 197-98.
24. Referred to as "aspiration." See generally BRUCE & THATCHER, supra note 17, at
248.
25. SILBER, supra note 10, at 199.
26. Id.
27. For an excellent discussion of transfer of embryos, see Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. &
Maureen McBrien, Embryo Donation: Unresolved Legal Issues in the Transfer of Surplus
Cryopreserved Embryos, 49 VILL. L. REv. 169 (2004).
28. See WARHus, supra note 14, at 167. For some couples, this is a favorable option
because the woman does not need to go through ovarian stimulation or aspiration.
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Several other procedures became tied to IVF. First, a procedure known as
gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT) was used to replace the mixing of eggs
and sperm in a Petri dish? 9 With GIFT, sperm and eggs were placed directly
into the fallopian tube and allowed to fertilize there, with the hope that the
fallopian tube would move the embryo down to the uterus at the natural time.3 °
Although the procedure initially grew in popularity because of a rise in
pregnancy rates with GIFT as opposed to traditional IVF, it quickly fell out of
favor with most physicians because there was no way to ensure either
fertilization or embryo quality and because the placing of sperm and egg into
the fallopian tubes required a surgical procedure. 31 A second related procedure,
known as zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT), was a combination of IVF and
32
GIFT; with ZIFT, eggs were still fertilized in a Petri dish, but the zygotes
were transferred into the fallopian tube rather than being placed in an
incubator.33 Both GIFT and ZIFT fell out of favor as other techniques helped
couples achieve pregnancy in less complicated ways.34 Two more related, but
even less widely used, procedures are tubal embryo transfer (TET) and
Pronuclear Stage Transfer (PROST).35 Both of these procedures differ from
IVF, GIFT, and ZIFT in the stage of development at which transfer of the
embryo was made. 6 The high cost of these procedures, along with their relative
37
lack of success compared to IVF, has made these much less popular than IVF.
D. ICSI and Related Procedures
Another form of ART, used on its own or in conjunction with IVF, is
intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI). 38 Developed by American and
European doctors in the mid 1990s, ICSI allows men with poor sperm amount
or quality to use their own sperm in fertilizing an egg. 39 With this procedure,
"each egg is individually injected with a single sperm under a microscope using
delicate microscopic tools"' 40 so that as long as there is one spermatozoa with
DNA, the egg will often become fertilized. 4 1 This procedure is sometimes used

29. SILBER, supra note 10, at 199.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 200. Interestingly, one of the reasons that GIFT is still occasionally used is
because it allows Catholic couples to "follow the papal injunction against IVF. The Catholic
church still fully approves GIFT because the papacy prefers that fertilization of the egg take
place inside the body rather than in a [Pletri dish." Id.
32. The pre-embryonic stage.
33. SILBER, supra note 10, at 200.
34. Id. at 201.
35. BRUCE &THATCHER, supra note 17, at 254-55.
36. Id. at 255.
37. Id.
38. See SILBER, supra note 10, at 247-71.
39. Id. at 247.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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in conjunction with sperm aspiration procedures, which are designed to extract
sperm from the male reproductive tract.42
The significance of these procedures for the purpose of choice of law
analysis is that they allow for the possibility of having reproductive
components (sperm, egg, or even cells from eggs) in different locations from
the people involved in the procedures, and thus, multiple persons and locations
may be involved in a lawsuit where the laws may differ.
E. Third-party Reproduction - and More

The procedures described above are used to make a baby using the genetic
materials (sperm and egg) and place for the embryo-fetus to develop (uterus) of
two people, whether known to each other or not.43 However, these procedures,
combined with other techniques and innovative solutions, have opened the door
to "reproduction" done with three or more people rather than two.
1. Ovum (Egg) Donation
For an egg donation, a woman first needs to be identified as a donor.4 The
menstrual cycles of the donor and recipient are manipulated to be in sync. 45 The
donor takes fertility medications of the kind described above to stimulate the
production of multiple eggs.46 These eggs are removed from her body and can
be fertilized with sperm. 47 The fertilized eggs can mature in a laboratory for up
to five days, at which point some of the fertilized eggs are transferred to the
recipient.48 While the donor is taking fertility medications, the recipient is
taking hormones to prepare her uterus to accept an embryo. 49 After the embryo
is implanted, the woman continues to take hormones to support the

pregnancy.5°

42. See generally BRUCE & THATCHER, supra note 17, at 256-57. These procedures
include percutaneous epididymal sperm aspiration ("PESA"), microsurgical sperm aspiration
("MESA"), and testicular sperm aspiration ("TESA"). Id. at 256.
43. For example, a woman might use her own eggs but sperm from a donor.
44. See generally BRUCE & THATCHER, supra note 17, at 257.
45. Id.
46. Id. A woman will often produce 10 to 20 eggs. Id. Although this is not yet done in
any reported or known fashion, it is at least theoretically possible that an egg donor could
donate eggs to more than one recipient, thus increasing the number of potential parties
involved.
47. Id. The sperm may be that of the husband of the woman who will carry the fetus,
thus creating a reproductive situation with three parties (egg donor, recipient, husband) or it
may be that of a sperm donor, which would add that donor as a replacement third party to the
reproductive process, but also, if the woman has a spouse, as a fourth party to the formation
of their family.

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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2. Donor Cytoplasm

A newer type of third-party reproduction is a procedure where a donor
donates the cytoplasm of her eggs, rather than her eggs themselves. 1 Very
simply, the cytoplasm is the component of the egg that makes the machinery of
the egg "work., 52 In this way, it is distinguished from the nucleus of the egg,
which contains most of the genetic material of the egg.53 Technically, this is a
form of third-party reproduction 54 because the components of a third party are
used in the reproductive process. However, since the donated cytoplasm is
added to the DNA containing the nucleus of the recipient, the resulting embryo
is more genetically related to the recipient than an embryo achieved through
egg donation. 55 Regardless, donor cytoplasm is currently under
study and
56
usually is not recommended as a procedure to achieve pregnancy.
3. Donor Sperm
Using donor sperm has become a less necessary option for heterosexual
couples who can improve sperm quality through other methods, but continues
to be an important option for single women and lesbian couples. 57 It is
recommended that those who choose this option use sperm from "a wellselected anonymous donor. 5 8 Sperm is generally chosen from a sperm bank
and then used to inseminate the prospective mother or to fertilize the chosen
eggs. 59 It is important for the recipient to choose a reputable sperm bank, as
some states do not require licensing of banks while others mandate stringent
screening for various diseases prior to donation.6 °
Some sperm donation is done less formally, such as where a friend
volunteers to donate a sperm sample. Most guidelines warn women to be very
careful of such donations in part because of the health risks that might not be
screened out as they would be at a sperm bank 6' and in part because the donor's
claim for parental rights, as discussed later, may depend on whether he is a
known donor.62

51. Id. at 258. In this procedure, cytoplasm from younger, donor, eggs is transplanted
into older or unhealthy eggs.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Or, if other donor components are used, can be "fourth-party" reproduction.
55. It is quite likely the possibility of a genetic connection that makes people want to
try this in the first place.
56. BRUCE & THATCHER, supra note 17, at 258.
57. KENIGSBERG & HARTMAN, supra note 9, at 306.
58. SILBER, supra note 10, at 411.
59. KENIGSBERG & HARTMAN, supra note 9, at 306.

60. Id.
61. Id. at 308-09.
62. CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIDE, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 36-37 (2006).
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4. Surrogacy ("Donor" Uterus)
The component of the surrogacy process that comes 63from a third party is
the uterus used to carry the embryo and then fetus to term.
A gestational surrogate "carries a pregnancy that is the product of an egg
and sperm of two other individuals." 64 In that way, a gestational surrogate
brings a third party to the reproductive process. A traditional surrogate is
inseminated with sperm from the male partner of the couple who wants the
baby; "the child that results is genetically related to the surrogate and
also to
' 65
the male partner, but not to the female partner of the infertile couple."
5. Donor Embryos
The procedure where embryos that exist are transferred into the uterus of a
woman 66 is the ART procedure that is the most ridden with problems, to the
extent that it is even hard to describe without contributing to the debate on it.
The discussion on this topic-and the description of this process as "adoption"
versus "donation" 6 7-highlights the differences of opinion that exist about the
precise status of an embryo. 68 For the purpose of this article, it is not necessary
to resolve that controversy or to label this procedure "donation" or "adoption."
The focus here remains on the facts that third- (and possibly fourth-) party
components (egg or sperm or both) are transferred to a woman whose uterus
then carries the fetus to term. The embryos may come from those that remain
after an IVF procedure 69 or may be embryos created in particular for this
procedure.70 With this procedure, there may be three parties involved in the
reproduction: the provider of the sperm for the embryo, the provider of the egg,
and the provider of the uterus that houses the embryo.
As a result of all of these advances in the area of assisted reproduction, the
number of people involved in making a baby and becoming parents could be as
many as five.'

63. See KENIGSBERG & HARTMAN, supra note 9, at 311-16. For an excellent discussion
of the legal issues involved in surrogacy, see Lori B. Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal
Boundaries: A Legal Frameworkfor SurrogateMotherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343 (1995).
64. BRUCE & THATCHER, supra note 17, at 260.
65. Id.

66. See id. at 258.
67. See Jessica L. Lambert, Developing a Legal Framework for Resolving Disputes
Between "Adoptive Parents" of Frozen Embryos: A Comparison to Resolutions of Divorce
Disputes Between Progenitors,49 B.C. L. REv. 529 (2008).
68. See Kindregan & McBrien, supra note 27, at 174-75; see also Tracy Haslett, J.B.
v. M.B.: The Enforcement of DispositionContracts and the Competing Interests of the Right
to Procreateand the Right Not to Procreate Where Donors of Genetic MaterialsDispute the
Disposition of Unused Preembryos, 20 TEMp. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 195 (2002) (discussing
embryos inthe context of the debate about abortion).
69. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
70. Id.
71. This assumes that there are two intended parents of either the same or different
genders. This does not take into account the interests of a surrogate's husband, or the
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Type of Conception
Conception Involving a Man and a
Woman
Donor Sperm
Donor Egg
Traditional Surrogacy
Gestational Surrogacy
Donor Embryo
Donor Egg and Donor Sperm
Donor Egg Plus Gestational Surrogate
Donor Egg Plus Donor Sperm Plus
Gestational Surrogate

Maximum Number of People
Involved:
2 (man and woman)
3 (two intended parents plus donor)
3 (two intended parents plus donor)
3 (two intended parents plus
surrogate, inseminated with sperm
from the male)
3 (two intended parents plus
surrogate)
4 (two intended parents plus the two
people who donated egg and sperm to
create the embryo)
4 (two intended parents plus donors of
egg and sperm)
4 (two intended parents plus egg
donor plus surrogate)
5 (two intended parents plus egg
donor, sperm donor, and surrogate)

Adding the fact that eggs and sperm can be separated geographically from
the donors-stored and moved to different locations-and that even cells from
embryos can be moved, the potential for interstate conflicts is significant. On
top of that, a court may need to adjudicate the-behavior of the physicians and
specialists involved, who could be in various states, and, if an out-of-state
insurance company also has interests in the case,72 even more potential arises
for interstate conflicts.
II.

THE LEGAL PROBLEMS CREATED: LAWSUITS AND LACK OF GUIDANCE

In order to consider the legal issues that arise from the use of ART in a
multistate context, it is necessary to first identify the legal issues presented by
the use of such technologies regardless of conflicts of law. There is a lack of
legislative guidance or regulation on much of what is done.73 The world of
ART has been referred to for many years as the "Wild West" of medicine
because it uses so many new technologies and reinvents medical procedures in

possibility of a larger blended family where there are more than two intended parents. That,
of course, could increase these numbers even more.
72. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 826 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Va.
1993), affd, 48 F.3d 778 (4th Cir. 1995), discussed infra; see also Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v.
Schoolcraft, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D. Colo. 2007), discussed infra.
73. INDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 62, at 24-25.
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unique ways.74 Because of this, lawsuits have arisen on a variety of issues, and

the differences in how these issues get resolved indicate both their intrinsic
difficulty and the lack of uniformity in the approaches themselves. In other
words, it is both the lack of legislation and inconsistency in judicial decisions
that creates problematic, conflicting situations.
A.

Lawsuits Resulting from Failures in the Technology Itself or Physician
Malpractice

The first category of lawsuits arising from ART includes those that stem
from allegations of malpractice. These types of lawsuits are akin to many
medical malpractice suits, though they can extend beyond that as well, due to
the lack of regulations and medical standards in this area. This category
includes several different types of cases.
One group of cases involves insemination using the wrong sperm.75 For
example, in one case, parents and their child, who was born through in vitro
fertilization, brought suit against the clinic, clinic owner, doctors, and
embryologist alleging medical malpractice and negligence.76 The couple,
Nancy and Thomas Andrews, had intended to use Thomas's sperm to fertilize
Nancy's egg, but instead sperm from another man was used.77 When baby

Jessica Andrews was born, she appeared to be of African or African American
descent while the father is white and her mother is from the Dominican
Republic. 78 According to their suit, one of their doctors originally told them
nothing was wrong and that Jessica would "get lighter over time." 79 When that
didn't happen, the couple bought a home DNA kit that confirmed that Thomas
Andrews was not the child's biological father. 80 The trial court found that the
Andrews couple could not recover for the emotional distress they experienced
when they were deprived of the chance to have their own genetic child, saying
that the birth of a healthy child is not a cognizable injury under New York
law. 81 However, the court allowed their emotional distress claim for the pain
they suffered over uncertainty as to whether their genetic material had been
improperly given to others, as well as their fear that Jessica's genetic father
might someday seek custody. 82 The trial court dismissed Jessica's claims for
emotional distress, finding that defendants owed no duty of care to her because
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75. See, e.g., Harnicherv. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67 (Utah 1998); see also
Andrews v. Kelz, 838 N.Y.S.2d 363 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007).
76. Andrews, 838 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
77. Id.
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Id. at 365-66.
Id. at 368-69.
82. Id. at 369.
HeinOnline -- 24 Wis. J. L. Gender, & Soc'y 36 2009

2009]

INTERSTATE INTERCOURSE

their alleged negligence took place before she was even in utero." However,
the court found that the Andrews couple was entitled to summary judgment in
their negligence claim against the embryologist on the grounds of res ipsa
loquitur because their circumstantial
evidence of negligence was strong and
84
unrebutted by the embryologist.
In a similar case, parents brought suit after the medical center allegedly
used sperm from a donor other than the one the couple had selected in order to
perform in vitro fertilization. 85 The couple, David and Stephanie Harnicher,
sought recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress, but the court,
affirming a grant of summary judgment to the hospital, determined that the
couple had failed to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
primarily because the couple stated in depositions that they had not suffered
any bodily harm as a result of the sperm mix-up. 86 The Harnichers apparently
had hoped to be able to have their own genetic child, but when that appeared
unlikely, their doctor suggested they use a mix of donor sperm and David's
sperm.87 The couple agreed but argued that they only agreed to the use of sperm
from one donor, No. 183, who physically resembled David and had the same
blood type.8 8 Essentially, if the children were not David's, they never wanted to
know about it. 89 However, after Stephanie gave birth to triplets, the couple
discovered the children were genetically neither David's nor donor 183's. 90 The
high court majority described the Harnichers' claim as one for "the destruction
of a fiction" that David was the children's father and refused to recognize that
as a basis for a suit for malpractice or negligent infliction of emotional
distress. 9 1
In another situation, several lawsuits sprang from allegations that a
fertility specialist, Dr. Jacobson, had inseminated patients with his own
sperm. 92 The main issue in one of the cases was whether a couple could testify

83. Id. at 370.
84. Id. at 372-73.
85. Harnicherv. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 68 (Utah 1998).
86. Id. at 71.
87. Id. at 68.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 74 (Durham, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 68.
91. Id. at 72. Note, however, that two justices dissented, finding that evidence of
mental distress on the Hamichers' part should have been enough for the case to go forward.
Id. at 77 (Durham, J., dissenting). The dissenters point out that the Harnichers specifically
contracted with the medical center for children who would appear to be David's; because the
children do not appear to be David's, the Harnischers did suffer an injury, which should have
been compensable. Id. at 74-75 (Durham, J., dissenting).
92. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 826 F. Supp. 155, 157 (E.D. Va.
1993), aff'd, 48 F.3d 778 (4th Cir. 1995); see also James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233 (4th Cir.
1993) (holding that a couple whose children were Dr. Jacobson's genetic offspring because
the wife had been inseminated with Jacobson's own sperm could proceed anonymously in
their medical malpractice suit against the doctor).
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anonymously, 93 but another case involved an insurance dispute related to the
activities described in the above suit, namely, Jacobson's insemination of his
patients with his own sperm. 94 St. Paul, the insurance company that insured
Jacobson and the clinic where he worked, sought a declaratory judgment that it
did not have to indemnify Jacobson or the clinic. 95 The insurer had provided a
professional liability policy to the clinic and Jacobson. 96 The insurer argued that
Jacobson lied on an insurance application,97 that it was against public policy to
have a duty to defend Jacobson for his own intentional misconduct, 98 and that
his activities did not constitute "professional services." 99 The court rejected all
of those arguments and granted summary judgment in favor of Jacobson and
the clinic.100 The court found that Jacobson did not lie on the application when
it asked whether he was aware of "any pending claims or activities (including
request for medical records) that might give rise to a claim in the future."' '°
Jacobson said yes, but was referring to an unrelated suit and did not disclose
any of his activities in inseminating patients with his own sperm.'0 2 The court
said this was at most a "non-disclosure," not a misrepresentation, and so the
response did not bar coverage. 103 The court also found that the activities clearly
arose out of Jacobson's professional services because they had to do with
insemination."'O And while the court said there are public policy considerations
that bar coverage for intentional wrongdoing, it said there were countervailing
policy concerns here, where the injured patients would ultimately benefit from
the coverage extended to Jacobson.'0 5 Further, the insurance policy could have
included a bar for intentional or criminal wrongdoing, but did not,'06
Another famous medical malpractice ART case involved a Doctor Stone,
who was on the faculty of a state university hospital and was sued as part of an
alleged "egg-stealing" scheme.'0 7 The allegations were that Stone and other
doctors affiliated with his reproductive clinic took human eggs and implanted
them in female patients without the egg donor's consent. 0 8 The appellate court
reversed the trial court's finding that the Regents of the University were
obligated to defend Stone in the suit brought by patients Susan and Wayne

93. James, 6 F.3d at 234.
94. St. Paul, 826 F. Supp. at 157.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 158.
98. Id. at 162.
99. Id. at 161-62.
100. Id. at 165.
101. Id. at 159.
102. Id. at 158.
103. Id. at 159.
104. Id. at 161-62.
105. Id. at 164-65.
106. Id. at 165.
107. Stone v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 94, 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
108. Id.
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Clay, ruling there was evidence to support the Regents' conclusion that Stone
was not entitled to a defense because he was not acting within the scope of his
employment at the time of the alleged scheme. 0 9 The court noted that Stone
had been a tenured professor for 18 years with a renowned fertility clinic; as
such, his conduct in allegedly stealing eggs was so "startling and unusual" that
it would be unfair to impose the risks of his conduct on the university. °
Other cases have focused on issues such as lack of consent in an
insemination procedure... and illness resulting from the procedure itself." 12 In
one such case, punitive damages were upheld, which is somewhat atypical in
these types of cases." 3 In that case, life partners Kelly and Caroline Chambliss
sued their fertility clinic and nurse, seeking compensatory and punitive
damages after Kelly became violently ill when the clinic inseminated her with
unwashed sperm in violation of its own safety procedures." 4 The jury ruled in
their favor, and the appeals court affirmed." 5 On appeal, the defendants argued
that evidence was insufficient to support an award of punitive damages. 116 But
the court disagreed, noting that the nurse admitted she violated the safety
protocol in several ways, including by failing to examine the sperm sample
under a microscope prior to the insemination. " 7 As such, there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to find that the nurse acted willfully and wantonly." 8
Yet other medical malpractice type cases involving ART have, not
surprisingly, focused on the duties of the insurance company. 1 9 One case was
an insurance dispute over whether the American Economy Insurance Co. was
required to defend and indemnify a doctor and clinic sued for allegedly failing
to screen a donor egg for cystic fibrosis, resulting in the birth via in vitro
fertilization of a baby girl suffering from the disease. 20 In the underlying
action, the child's parents brought suit against their doctor and the clinic where
he practiced; that suit was eventually settled with the dismissal of the
complaints against the named doctors and the clinic's agreement to go to

109. Id. at 101-02.
110. Id. at 102.
111. See Kerns v. Schmidt, 641 N.E.2d 280, 286 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a
husband could maintain a private right of action against a doctor who negligently failed to
obtain the husband's consent to a nonspousal artificial insemination); but see Shin v. Kong,
95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 304, 307 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a father and husband could not
bring a tort claim against a physician who had performed an artificial insemination on his
former wife without his consent because he was never a patient himself).
112. See Chambliss v. Health Sci. Found., 626 S.E.2d 791 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
113. Id. at 795.
114. Id. at 793-94.
115. Id. at 794, 796.
116. Id. at 794.
117. Id. at 794-95.
118. Id. at 795.
119. Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. Schoolcraft, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D. Colo. 2007).
120. Id. at 1237-38.
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arbitration on the issue of damages.' 12 The arbitration award to the parents
exceeded the available insurance coverage under the clinic's professional
liability policy, which is why the parties were looking to American Economy's
commercial general liability policy. 122 American Economy filed suit seeking a
declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the clinic because the
accusations in the Goff/Taylor suit fell into the professional services exclusion
in the policy. 23 The court agreed, finding the allegations were all related to the
in vitro fertilization procedure, as well as
provision of medical services in an
24

genetic screening and counseling. 1
B.

Lawsuitsfrom Improper Genetic Diagnosis

Another type of ART medical malpractice case is that of improper genetic
diagnosis.' 25 These types of cases are unique to ART because ART makes

certain types of pre-implantation diagnosis possible, or at least easier to
perform. 126 Problems also arise because the possibility of diagnosis that would
have been unavailable without ART raises127the parents' expectations that they
will have a child free of genetic "defects."'
These types of cases are difficult in and of themselves because of the
proof issues involved, 128 but also because they confront courts with the issue of
whether to allow recovery for "wrongful life,"' 129 a controversial, and,
importantly for this article, conflicting topic

30

for the states and courts.

121. Id.

122. Id. at 1238.
123. Id. at 1239-40.
124. Id. at 1242-44.
125. See, e.g., Paretta v. Med. Offices for Human Reprod., 760 N.Y.S.2d 639 (2003),
discussed infra, notes 131-37 and accompanying text. For an interesting discussion of
possible parentalliability, see Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, CreatingChildren with Disabilities:
Parental Tort Liability for PreimplantationGenetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 299
(2008).

126.

SILBER,

supra note 10, at 323-56.

127. These heightened expectations may also create a climate more conducive to
lawsuits.
128. For example, it is very hard to prove exactly how, when, and where the
negligence occurred.
129. See, e.g., Paretta,760 N.Y.S.2d at 641; see also Brown v. Wyatt, 202 S.W.3d 555
(Ark. Ct. App. 2005) (holding, in a husband and father's suit for the doctor's failure to obtain
his written consent to his wife's insemination, that the plaintiff could not recover for
negligence and the tort of "outrage" and also noting that the husband was essentially seeking
to recover for "wrongful birth," which was not recognized under Arkansas law).
130. Compare Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983) (allowing
siblings born with birth defects to recover damages for medical treatment from doctors who
failed to research the possible effects of a seizure drug) and Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954
(Cal. 1982) (ruling that a deaf child could recover damages from doctors who failed to warn
her parents of a hereditary disorder prior to her conception), with Walker v. Mart, 790 P.2d
735 (Ariz. 1990) (refusing to allow "wrongful life" action where doctors failed to diagnose
the risk of severe birth defects in utero that would have prompted the mother to have an
abortion; the court held that bringing a child into the world cannot be an injury to that child).
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For example, in one case, parents of a child born with cystic fibrosis
brought suit against health care facilities and doctors involved in an in vitro
fertilization procedure performed on the wife using a donor egg and the
husband's sperm. 13 1 The couple alleged that the defendants failed to warn them
that the egg donor was a carrier of cystic fibrosis and failed to test the father to
determine if he was a carrier of the disease. 32 Cystic fibrosis is inherited from
both parents, and the child was born with the disease, requiring several
surgeries and treatment for the rest of her life. 13 3 The parents brought a number
of claims against the defendants, seeking, among other things, recovery for
emotional distress and expenses related to the child's care and treatment. 34 The
court dismissed all claims brought on the child's behalf, agreeing with the
defendants that it would amount to a "wrongful life" claim, which New York
law does not recognize. 135 The court also rejected the emotional distress claims
brought by the parents, but found that they could pursue recovery for the
expenses they incurred caring for their sick child possibly even including the
wife's lost wages for having to leave her job to care for their daughter. 136 The
court also left open the possibility37of recovery for punitive damages against the
defendants for gross negligence. 1
In a similar case, parents and son sued their doctor, fertility clinic, and a
genetic testing lab after the son was born with cystic fibrosis. 138 In 1993, the
parents had a daughter with cystic fibrosis, so they turned to the defendants 1to
39
try to ensure their next child would be born without the genetic disorder.
Although their doctor sent cells from their embryos to be genetically tested, the
test results were apparently erroneous, and the mother was implanted with an
embryo (the son) that had the genetic mutation for cystic fibrosis. 140 The son
himself brought a negligence claim against the defendants, but the court
dismissed it on the grounds it was a "wrongful life" claim not cognizable under
Massachusetts law. 14 1 The court stated that determining such a claim would
require comparing the value of an impaired life with the value of
42
nonexistence. 1

131. Paretta, 760 N.Y.S.2d at 639, 641.
132. Id. at 641-42.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 642.
135. Id. at 645-46.
136. ld. at 647.
137. Id.
138. Doolan v. IVF Am. Inc., No. 993476, 2000 WL 33170944 (Super. Ct. Mass. Nov.
20, 2000).
139. Id. at *1.
140. Id. at **1-2.
141. Id. at **3-4.
142. Id. at *2. The court dismissed Thomas's claim for the financial expense of his
treatment but said that his parents might be able to recover those costs. Id. at *3. The court
also dismissed the parents' claim for loss of consortium due to their child's illness. It found
that in order to make such an award, it would have to compare their relationship with their
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In some instances, the new technologies themselves may create a situation
where litigation is more likely. In this group are the variety of lawsuits where
the suit itself is not about a mistake, malfunction, or malpractice; these lawsuits
occur when a dispute arises about parentage143 or the rights of a surrogate
and/or biological parents who use a surrogate,144 or inheritance issues for ART
offspring and posthumous use of sperm. 141
1.

Parentage

Parentage disputes are not unique to ART, of course, but the possibility of
ART certainly raises the potential issues that can cause such disputes.
Robert B. v. Susan B. is a fairly typical parentage dispute case.' 46 The case
involved a dispute over two-year-old Daniel B. who was born to Susan B., a
single woman, after a fertility clinic wrongly implanted in her embryos that
were meant for Robert and Denise B., a married couple. 147 The appellate court
affirmed the trial court's ruling that Susan was Daniel's mother and Robert was
his father, while Denise was dismissed for lack of standing. 48 In May 2000,
Robert and Denise had gone to the clinic and contracted to use an anonymous
egg donor's egg, which was fertilized with Robert's sperm. 149 At the same time,
Susan wanted to find a donor egg and sperm from two strangers and to use the
resultant embryos for her own IVF procedure. 50 When she became pregnant,
Susan assumed that was what happened, but several months after she gave
birth, she learned she had mistakenly received embryos intended for Robert and
Denise.'-" After an initial attempt at visitation among the three failed, Robert
and Denise brought a parentage suit. 152 The trial court dismissed Denise from
the case and awarded temporary custody to Susan and temporary visitation to
Robert. 153 On appeal, Susan argued that her case should be deemed similar to
those involving sperm donors, in which the donor is not deemed the child's
natural father, but, interestingly, the appeals court rejected that argument

actual son to the relationship they would have had with a hypothetical healthy son had the
defendants not been negligent. Id. at **4-5. The court said this would be too speculative a
basis on which to award damages. Id. at *5.
143. Infra notes 146-98 and accompanying text.
144. Infra notes 199-239 and accompanying text.
145. See Hecht v. SuperiorCourt, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), discussed
infra notes 255-60 and accompanying text.
146. See Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 790.
149. Id. at 786.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 786-87.
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because Robert never intended to be a sperm donor. 154 The appeals court
likewise rejected Denise's argument that she should have standing in the suit
because she was the intended mother of Daniel; here, the appeals court agreed
with the trial court that Denise lacked
standing because she had no genetic or
155
gestational relationship to Daniel.
In another case, a mother of twins brought a parentage suit against her
former long-term boyfriend seeking child support for children conceived
through artificial insemination by an anonymous donor. 156 The Illinois Supreme
Court found the Parentage Act did not bar Alexis Mitchell's claims for child
support based on common law theories of oral contract or promissory
estoppel. 1 7 The court said that the best interests of children would be served by
recognizing that "parental responsibility may be imposed based on conduct
evincing actual consent to the artificial insemination procedure."' 58 In sum, if
former boyfriend Raymond Banary's
conduct led to the birth of the children, he
159
should be made to support them.
Other parentage cases have involved issues relating to obligations of
parents for child support, both for opposite- and same-sex couples. 160 Sadly, but
not surprisingly, the parentage cases have been tougher for the same-sex
petitioners, as exemplified in a Massachusetts case where the biological mother
of a child born through artificial insemination sought child support from her
former domestic partner, with whom she had been living at the time she
conceived the child. 16 ' The Probate and Family Court judge found the couple
had an implied agreement to create a child, which the domestic partner had
breached, but made no determination as to support. 162 The Supreme Judicial

154. Id. at 787.
155. Id. at 788-89.
156. In re Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144 (111. 2003).
157. Id. at 151-52.
158. Id. at 152.
159. Id. Cf Brown v. Brown, 125 S.W.3d 840, 843-44 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003) (holding,
ina parentage dispute over twins born via artificial insemination, that while a husband never
consented to an insemination procedure in writing, as required by Arkansas law, the children
his wife bore while they were married were legally his because he allowed his name to be
used on the birth certificate and recognized the children as his own until his former wife
began talking about divorce), and Lane v. Lane, 1996-NMCA-23, 121 N.M. 414, 23, 912
P.2d 290, 296 (holding, in an insemination case, that a husband who did not sign a consent
for insemination was still legally the father because he manifested his consent to the
insemination through his actions and words).
160. See, e.g., Jackson v. Jackson, 739 N.E.2d 1203, 1213 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that an ex-husband had a duty to support twins born to his former wife during their
marriage as a result of artificial insemination. The court noted that although the husband did
not consent in writing to the procedure, the ex-wife had met her burden of showing that he
orally consented to the procedure); see also T.F. v. B.L, 813 N.E.2d 1244 (Mass. 2004).
161. T.F., 813 N.E.2d at 1244.
162. Id. at 1246.
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Court agreed that there had been an implied contract to create a child, but found
it unenforceable under Massachusetts law.' 63
In contrast, a California court held that a California statute explicitly
stated that there can be no paternity claim from a sperm donor who is not
married to a woman who becomes pregnant via the donated semen, so long as
that semen is provided to a licensed doctor. 164 The court determined that the
law makes no exception for a sperm donor known to the woman in question,
even if he is a sexual partner of the woman, and thus denied the paternity claim
of a man who was the sperm donor and genetic father of a child born to his
lover, who was challenging paternity. 165
Generally, husbands are unable to escape paternity when their sperm is
involved in the fertilization of an egg that eventually leads to a baby. 166 For
example, in a case where a former husband filed a paternity suit over a child
born to his ex-wife through in vitro fertilization performed after their divorce,
the appellate court affirmed the court's holding in the former husband's
favor. 167 The couple, Donald McGill and Mildred McGill Schmidt, had sought
IVF treatment during their marriage, but it did not work. 68 Four of their preembryos were frozen, but their divorce decree did not address what would
happen to the stored pre-embryos. 169 Three months after the divorce, McGill
accompanied Schmidt to the clinic where she attempted IVF again, this time
successfully.170 However, the parties disagreed as to McGill's rights.' 7 ' McGill
said they agreed he would be the father while his ex-wife said he donated the
pre-embryos to her. 7 2 In finding McGill to be the children's legal father, the

163. Id. at 1251; but see id. at 1254 (Greaney, J., dissenting) (three dissenting justices
would have ordered the domestic partner to pay child support). See K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d
673 (Cal. 2005) (holding that a woman who donated her eggs to her former lesbian partner
was a parent of the twin girls her partner gave birth to via in vitro fertilization because the
provision of the Uniform Parentage Act preventing sperm donors from being considered the
father of children so born did not apply here).
164. Steven S. v. Deborah D., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482, 487 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
165. Id. at 487-88.
166. See, e.g., In re O.G.M., 988 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. App. 1999). See also In re Baby
Doe, 353 S.E.2d 877, 878-89 (S.C. 1987) (holding that a husband was responsible for child
support to a child born to his wife as a result of artificial insemination even without written
consent. If the husband agrees to the insemination with the understanding that the child will
be treated as his own, he is the legal father; his consent can be express or implied); K.S. v.
G.S., 440 A.2d 64, 68 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981) (noting that some states require written
consent to insemination, but finding that public policy considerations required a strong
presumption of consent and a strong burden on the father attempting to show that he revoked
the consent); but see In re Marriage of Witbeck-Wildhagen, 667 N.E.2d 122 (111. App. Ct.
1996) (finding no obligation without written consent), discussed infra notes 176-79 and
accompanying text.
167. In re O.G.M., 988 S.W.2d at 473.
168. Id. at 474.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 474-75.
171. Id. at 475.

172. Id.
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trial court relied on several factors, including that he was named the father on
the birth certificate, that the pre-embryos were conceived while the couple was
married, that McGill was present when the IVF took place, and that O.G.M.
would only have one parent if174he were denied paternity. 173 The appeals court
found that evidence sufficient.
In direct contrast to this, an Illinois court interpreted the Illinois Parentage
Act, which is modeled on section 5 of the Uniform Parentage Act 175 to require a
husband's written consent to artificial insemination before he could be held to a
duty of child support. 176 In a case where a husband was not the biological father
of the child, where he had made it clear that he did not want a child, and where
his wife was inseminated without his knowledge, the court denied the mother's
claim for child support when the couple divorced. 7 7 The court found that the
legislature intended that the husband's written consent be a prerequisite to the
creation of a parent-child relationship and that, in this particular case, there was
no other statutory or equitable basis to hold the husband responsible for the
child. 1 78 The court recognized the boy had a need of support
but said the
79
husband also had a right to decide not to become a parent.
In sum, a husband who becomes a father through his wife's insemination
with someone else's sperm continues to be responsible for child support even
after the couple splits up.180 In contrast, a man who is merely a sperm donor,
who relinquishes his rights, and/or has no relationship to the mother, is usually
not found to be the legal father or held to paternity obligations.' 8 ' In fact, the
rights and duties of sperm donors are different from those of egg donors,
surrogates, and marital partners; these rights are discussed more fully later in
the article.' 82
One rather unique case relating to parentage was brought by a girl born
through artificial insemination against the doctors and clinic involved, alleging
that their failure to certify the signature of her mother's then-husband deprived
the girl of a legal father. 183 The girl's mother underwent artificial insemination
in 1992 and her then-husband signed a consent form, but the doctors did not

173. Id. at 478.
174. Id.

175. In re Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144, 149 (111. 2003).
176. In re Marriage of Witbeck-Wildhagen, 667 N.E.2d 122, 125 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
177. Id. at 125-26.
178. id. at 125.
179. Id. at 125-26.
180. People v. Sorenson, 437 P.2d 495, 499 (Cal. 1968) (noting that the child would
not have been born without the father's participation).
181. See Lainaritata v. Lucas, 823 So. 2d 316, 319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (finding
that under Florida law sperm donors relinquish all parental rights and that in this case the
parties also had a contract providing that the donor would have no parental rights).
182. See infra notes 240-60 and accompanying text.
183. Alexandria S. v. Pac. Fertility Med. Ctr. Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 23 (Cal. Ct. App.

1997).
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certify his signature as required by state law. 184 In the couple's divorce
proceedings, the husband testified that their marriage was already falling apart
at the time of the insemination; he said he signed a form authorizing the
procedure so his wife could be a mother but denied signing any consent form
that would make him the legal father of the child. 185 After the dissolution, the
court found the husband was not legally obligated to support the daughter and
she brought suit against the doctors through her mother.' 86 Her negligence
action claimed her mother would not have been inseminated if she had not
thought that the husband would take responsibility for the child. 87 She also
claimed the clinic's negligent misrepresentation resulted in her birth. 88 The
appeals court affirmed the dismissal of the suit, declining to recognize a tort for
the deprivation of a legal parent on public policy grounds.' 89 The court stated
that to recognize such a theory would invite suits from children with nontraditional parents, such as single or gay parents. 190 The court declined to find
that illegitimacy is an injury under the law.' 9 '
What makes ART parentage cases most challenging, and what leads to
conflicts in the laws, is that some courts do not use uniform parentage laws to
decide these types of cases. 192 One recent case dealt with the difficult issue of
how to determine parentage when an unmarried couple decides to undergo in
vitro fertilization using donor eggs, the sperm of the male partner, and the
uterus of the female partner. 19 3 In this case, a couple underwent in vitro as
described, and the female partner gave birth to triplets. 194 Later, the relationship
turned sour, and the woman filed a petition in the lower court to establish
parentage and obtain custody and child support.' 95 The man, in turn, argued that
she lacked standing to seek that relief because she was not the genetic mother
of the children and sought sole custody himself. 196 The Tennessee Supreme
Court, ruling on a case of first impression in that state, found that Tennessee's
parentage laws did not apply to the situation at issue here, where there was no
marriage or surrogacy contract. 197 In a narrowly crafted opinion, the court held

184. Id. at 24-25.
185. Id. at 25.
186. Id. at 25-26.
187. Id. at 30.
188. Id.

189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. Interestingly, and related to the discussion, supra note 130 and accompanying
text, on wrongful life, the court also found that Alexandria was essentially bringing a
"wrongful life" suit, which was not cognizable under California law because she was born
healthy. Id. at 30-31.
192. See, e.g., In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714 (Tenn. 2005), discussed infra.
193. Id. at 716.
194. Id. at 718.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 718-19.
197. Id. at 722-23.
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that the woman was the legal mother due to: (1) the intent of both partners that
she become a parent; (2) her adoption of the legal responsibilities of
parenthood; (3) her having given birth to the children; and (4) the fact that there
was no controversy between her and the genetic mother of the children, an
anonymous egg donor who had waived her parental rights.198
2.

Surrogacy

Surrogacy cases have been in the spotlight for almost twenty years, since
the famous case of Baby M.199 Disputes over surrogacy have concerned issues
of parentage, as above, and conflicts over who should be deemed the parent. As
this section will address, some disputes arise when the surrogate seeks to keep
the child or children to whom she gave birth; some, more surprisingly, arise in
situations where the genetic or intended parents and the surrogate herself agree
that the parents should have the child, but other parties, or the courts, intervene.
Some courts have been confronted with the issue of a surrogate who seeks
to have her name removed from a birth certificate.2 0 In one such case, despite
concerns that a child would be "motherless," the court allowed a surrogate to

do just that, noting that in light of Maryland's Equal Rights Amendment, the
state's parentage laws should be read to allow women as well as men to deny
their parentage of a child; as such, a gestational carrier of a child should be able
to receive a court order dictating that she is not the child's parent.20 '
Some laws about surrogacy itself have been challenged in the courts.2 °2
For example, a biological mother of triplets born via gestational surrogate
challenged the constitutionality of an Arizona law that declared the surrogate to
be the legal mother of children born to her. 0 3 The law, Arizona Revised
Statutes section 25-218(B), prohibited surrogacy agreements. 2 04 However, it
allowed that the genetic father of a child so born would have a chance to
establish paternity. 0 No such provision was made for the mother.20 6 In

198. Id. at 730. The dissent, focusing on the language of Tennessee law, noted that
intent and gestation should not be used as factors to determine parentage because the laws
instead rely on genetics, marriage, or adoption; while Cindy could adopt the children, the
dissent would not find that she was their legal mother. Id. at 736 (Birch, J., dissenting).
199. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (finding that a surrogacy agreement
conflicted with New Jersey laws prohibiting payment for adoptions because of a public
policy against baby bartering and that the agreement itself was in "total disregard of the best
interests of the child", but still allowing the biological parents legal rights because it was in
the baby's best interest to remain with them given that their family life was more stable). An
excellent discussion of these issues is found in Amy M. Larkey, Redefining Motherhood:
Determining Legal Maternity in Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements, 51 DRAKE L. REV.

605 (2003).
200. In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 117-20 (Md. 2007).
201. Id. at 124-25.

202. Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
203. Id. at 1358.
204. Id. at 1359.
205. Id.
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affirming the trial judge's finding of unconstitutionality, the court said the
interest of the genetic mother in proving maternity was equal to the father's
interest in proving paternity, and thus the
law could not stand without affording
20 7
the mother a means to prove maternity.
In other states, surrogacy laws have been upheld.2 °8 One suit was brought
by prospective surrogate mothers and infertile couples challenging Michigan's

Surrogate Parenting Act, which prohibited surrogacy agreements. 20 9 The
Michigan appellate court affirmed the constitutionality of the law, although it
interpreted the law differently from the trial judge.2" ° The plaintiffs contended
that the law violated the due process guarantee of freedom from government
interference in matters of procreation. 21' The appeals court disagreed and,
reciting some of the most commonly used arguments against surrogacy
agreements, found that the state had a compelling interest in forbidding

surrogacy agreements to (1) prevent children from becoming commodities; (2)
protect the best interests of the child, which are not preserved by surrogacy

agreements; and (3) prevent the exploitation of women.21 2 The court held that
the law forbade surrogacy agreements involving (1) conception, either through
natural or artificial insemination of, or surrogate gestation by, a female; and (2)
the voluntary surrender of her parental rights to the child. 213 The court also
noted a recent legislative amendment that created a presumption that every
surrogacy contract includes a provision by which the surrogate agrees to give
up her parental rights but did not comment on the constitutionality of the law as
amended.2 14

In addition to differences in the laws themselves, the differences in the
judicial resolution of surrogacy cases illustrate both the potential legal issues
that ART
creates and the differences in the state courts' disposition of those
5
cases.

21

The easiest cases and those where there has been the most consistency are
cases 1) from states that allow surrogacy agreements 21 6 and 2) where there is no

206. Id.
207. Id. at 1361. Accord J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Utah 2002) (holding
unconstitutional a challenged provision of Utah law mandating that a surrogate mother is, for
all legal purposes, deemed the mother of a child born through such an agreement because the
law was an undue burden on the biological mother's fundamental right to bear and raise her
own children).
208. See, e.g., Doe v. Attorney Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992). See also
the chart in Part D, 1, infra, for a more detailed description of the laws of each state.
209. Id. at 485.
210. Id. at 486.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 486-87.
213. Id. at 488-89.
214. Id. at 489.
215. Here, the focus is on different cases, each of which was just a single-state case
and did not involve conflicts issues. Later, the article examines surrogacy disputes that touch
upon several states, which requires the courts to determine which (differing) law will apply.
216. See table on surrogacy laws, infra.
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challenge to the biological parents' request to have legal parentage. For
example, in one Connecticut case, a married Venezuelan couple entered into a
gestational surrogacy agreement with a Connecticut couple to have the
Connecticut wife carry the Venezuelan couple's genetic child and then turn
over the child to the Venezuelan couple. 217 The Venezualan couple was able to
obtain a declaration of parental rights over the child (including being named as
the parents on the birth certificate) in large part because neither the Connecticut
couple, nor the state department of health, nor the hospital where the child was
to be born objected.11 8 The court noted that a number of other Connecticut
superior courts had recognized gestational surrogacy agreements, and state laws
allowed for replacement birth certificates, which appeared to reflect a public
policy in favor of the court having authority to issue orders regarding surrogate
parentage. 2 ' 9 The court reviewed the surrogacy agreement but found it to be fair
and reasonable and entered an order naming the Venezuelan couple the legal
and biological parents of the baby.22 °
In one New York case, a couple was unable to obtain a pre-birth order
declaring the biological mother of triplets-and not the surrogate who had
carried them-to be the legal mother, but was able to obtain such an order after
the babies' birth.22' Interestingly, in cases similar to this one, even states that do
not allow for surrogacy agreements and might not enforce an agreement itself
do allow for parentage declarations for the biological parents if the surrogate
does not dispute the request.222 However, even in cases where there is no
challenge to the biological mother's claim of legal parentage, some courts have
223
been reluctant to allow the biological mother to be listed as the legal parent.
In some cases where the surrogate seeks to keep the child, courts have
been reluctant to "enforce" the surrogacy agreement by giving legal rights to
the biological parents instead of the surrogate. However, in other cases, even
where the surrogate seeks to keep the baby and even where the state may have
a policy against surrogacy agreements, courts have granted the biological
parents legal rights if it is in the "best interests" of the child.224 If nothing else,

217. De Bernardo v. Gregory, No. FA074007658S, 2007 WL 4357736, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2007).
218. Id. at **3-4.
219. Id. at **2-3.
220. Id. at **3-4.
221. Doe v. N.Y City Bd. of Health, 782 N.Y.S.2d 180 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
222. See id. at 183.
223. See, e.g., Andres A. v. Judith N., 591 N.Y.S.2d 946 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992)
(holding, in a case where petitioners were a husband and wife who had twins via gestational
surrogacy and brought an uncontested petition to be declared the mother and father of the
twins, that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction but noting that the biological mother
could move to adopt her children). The opinion also notes that, in 1992, the New York
legislature passed a law making surrogacy contracts void, but that law was not at issue here.
Id. at 948.
224. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), discussed supra note 199.
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it can be said that there is very little consistency in how the courts have handled
surrogacy-related legal disputes.
To the extent that there has been any consistency amongst the various
state courts in resolving tricky parentage issues with surrogates, it has been
with the use of the "intent" test.225 In 1993, the California courts reviewed a
case of first impression in that state where a husband and wife sought a legal
declaration that they were the parents of a child born to a gestational
surrogate. 226 The Supreme Court affirmed the trial and appellate courts' holding
in favor of the genetic parents but analyzed the case under the Uniform
Parentage Act,227 which it acknowledged was not designed to resolve surrogacy
disputes. 228 Nonetheless, the court said the law provided a framework for
determining a child's natural mother: the woman who gives birth to a child is
presumptively the natural mother. 229 However, the UPA allows genetic mothers
to prove their natural parentage through genetic testing, which in this case
showed the wife to be the genetic mother of the child.230 Noting that although
under the UPA both the surrogate and the genetic mother had proven
"maternity," the court employed a tie-breaker based on the intent of the parties,
noting that it was the genetic parents who intended to bring a child into the
world and raise it. 231 As such, it affirmed the ruling of the lower courts. The
court also determined that surrogacy contracts were not inconsistent with
California
public policy, 232 which two concurring justices found went a step too
233
far.

In a different kind of case in which the intent test was employed, a New
York court rejected a father's argument that he was the only "parent" of
children born via egg donation, finding that his wife, who had carried and given
birth to23 the
couple's twins with the intent of raising them, was the natural
4
mother.
In yet another situation in which the intent test was used, a California
court was faced with a situation where a husband and wife agreed to have an
embryo genetically unrelated to either of them be implanted in a surrogate, who

225. See generally Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
226. Id. at 777-78.
227. Discussed infra notes 597-602 and accompanying text.
228. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779.
229. Id. at 780.
230. Id. at 781.
231. Id. at 782.
232. Id. at 783-85.
233. Id. at 787-88. A dissenting justice would have employed a best interests of the
child standard to determine who should be the child's legal mother. Id. at 789, 799-800
(Kennard, J., dissenting). That justice also mentioned model legislation by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the Uniform Status of Children of
Assisted Conception Act, which would have required court approval of surrogacy
agreements for them to be valid. Id. at 793-94. The dissent also criticized the majority
opinion as a "sweeping endorsement of unregulated gestational surrogacy." Id. at 798.
234. McDonald v. McDonald,608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
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would carry the child and give birth for them.235 However, after the pregnancy,
the couple broke up and the court had to decide who were the legal parents of
the child: the wife wanted the court to declare her the legal mother of the child;
the husband contended he was not the legal father.236 The trial court, after
accepting a stipulation that the surrogate and her husband were not the legal
parents of the child, determined further that the husband and wife were also not
the legal parents, so the child effectively had no legal parents.237 The appeals
court sharply disagreed and reversed. 238 The appeals court relied in part on the
"intended parents" analysis of Johnson and held that the child would not have
been born but for the actions of the husband and wife.239
3.

Lawsuits Related to Sperm Donation

Lawsuits regarding sperm donation are of course linked to parentage
suits 240 and also demonstrate the wide variety of both legal issues and methods
for resolving them that ART creates. In particular, these suits are important
because sperm donation-use of sperm from a bank, for example-can easily
be done across state lines and thus has the potential for creating conflicts of law
situations.24 1
In one case, a mother sought child support from a known sperm donorher former lover-while she was married to another man.242 Both the trial and
appeals courts found an agreement between the mother and the donor releasing
him from any obligation to pay child support to be unenforceable on public
policy grounds essentially because the right to support belongs to the child and
cannot be waived by the parents.243 The Supreme Court reversed, finding the
agreement was similar to what occurs in a standard artificial insemination
procedure and was therefore enforceable.244 The Supreme Court invoked the
Uniform Parentage Act,245 which provides that sperm donors have no parental

235. In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
236. Id. at 282-83.
237. Id. at 283.
238. Id. at 282.
239. Id. at 288-89. Essentially, the court applied the rules of artificial insemination to
situations where a husband consents to the insemination of his wife and is usually deemed
the legal father. Id. at 285-87. The appeals court found the same should be true when a
husband and wife contract with a surrogate to carry a child on their behalf, regardless of
whether they are genetically related to the child. Id. at 288.
240. Discussed supra notes 146-98 and accompanying text.
241. See, e.g., Guardianshipof .H., 834 A.2d 922 (Me. 2003) (relying on California
common law in part to address a question of whether a donor to a California sperm bank
must receive notice when the sperm is used to inseminate a woman in Maine, and the woman
and her lesbian partner subsequently petition to become the child's legal parents).
242. Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007).
243. Id. at 1238.
244. Id. at 1245-48.
245. Discussed infra notes 597-602 and accompanying text. Note that it has not been
adopted in Pennsylvania, which was the grounds for the dissent of one of the justices.
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rights or responsibilities. 4 6 The court noted that the sperm donor and the
mother "imbue[d] the transaction with the hallmarks of institutional, non-sexual
conception" by entering into the agreement outside the context of a romantic
relationship and hiding the donor's identity as the genetic father. 247 As such, the
court found that the principles that normally apply to 248
sperm donation should
apply, and the donor should not be made to pay support.
In a case where the sperm donor brought suit to establish paternity over a
child, a California Appellate court affirmed a lower court's finding that the
donor was the child's legal father and that he should have visitation rights.249
The court relied on California's version of the Uniform Parentage Act, which
provides that if a sperm donation is made to a licensed doctor for use in
artificial insemination, the law treats the donor as if he were not the natural
father of the child so conceived. 250 Here, the mother-a nurse--did not rely on
the law's provisions but instead had the donor make the donation directly to her
and inseminated herself.2 5 ' The court made clear that it was not passing
judgment on traditional versus non-traditional families, but was instead ruling
on the particular circumstances of this case, including the failure to conduct the
insemination through a physician.252
In direct contrast to this, an Oregon court held that under Oregon law,
sperm donors have no rights or obligations to children born through artificial
25 3
insemination, regardless of whether a doctor is involved in the insemination.
However, that court noted that if, as in the situation before them, the donor
could establish that he and the mother in fact had an agreement whereby he
should have the rights and responsibilities of fatherhood, and that he relied on
that agreement in donating his semen, then the state could not absolutely bar a
biological father's efforts to assert the rights and responsibilities of
fatherhood. 54
An entirely different case illustrates a new situation in sperm donation: the
posthumous use of sperm.255 In a 1993 California case, the former girlfriend of

Ferguson, 940 A.2d at 1250. The lack of uniform acceptance of the Uniform Parentage Act
may also lead to tricky conflicts situations.
246. Ferguson, 940 A.2d at 1243.

247. Id. at 1246.
248. Jd. at 124748.
249. Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
250. Id. at 533 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005).
251. Id. at 532.
252. Id. at 537-38.
253. Mclnre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
254. Id. at 24345. See also In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989) (remanding a case for
further proceedings to determine if there was an agreement between the mother and the
donor).
255. No doubt familiar to viewers of the TV show Ugly Betty (ABC television
broadcast). For a thorough and interesting analysis (of the case, not the show), see Lori B.
Andrews & Nanette Elster, Regulating Reproductive Technologies, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 35,
53-54 (2000).
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a man who committed suicide got into a dispute with his surviving adult
children over the disposition of his frozen sperm. 256 The man had left a
rambling suicide note in which he indicated his wish that his girlfriend have his
child after he died; he also bequeathed his frozen sperm to her in his will, but
his children contested the validity of that document.257 The trial court ordered
the destruction of his sperm, but the appellate court vacated that order and
remanded for findings of fact on issues including the validity of the will and
whether the man intended to father a child posthumously with his girlfriend.258
The court rejected the adult children's arguments that the public policy of
California prohibited both the artificial insemination of unmarried women and
post-mortem artificial insemination.2 59 The court assumed, for the sake of
argument, that there was evidence to establish intent of parenthood, holding
that if the man and woman intended to conceive a child after his death, there
was no state interest sufficient to prevent them from doing so.260
4.

Lawsuits over Embryos

Cases involving embryos are, of course, unique to ART and have arisen in
both a medical malpractice context and in cases where there is a dispute about
the use and/or disposition of the embryos.26'
One representative case in the medical malpractice context involved a
couple who went to a fertility clinic and underwent in vitro fertilization, which
resulted in the birth of a healthy son. 26 2 However, the couple brought suit
against the clinic, alleging that on the day before the successful implantation,
the embryologist negligently dropped a tray containing nine embryos,
destroying all but one.263 The couple sought damages for negligence, bailment,
and wrongful death although they later acknowledged a wrongful death claim
did not exist for the destruction of embryos. 264 The clinic filed a motion to
dismiss, alleging that the plaintiffs had failed to file the expert's report required
in cases of medical negligence. 65 The trial court denied the motion, but the

256. Hecht v. SuperiorCourt, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 275-76 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
257. Id. at 276-77.
258. Id. at 279, 289 n.9, 291.
259. Id. at 284-89. On this issue, the adult children argued in part that a child being
born after their father's death would be psychologically unhealthy for the adult children, as
well as a potential financial burden to the estate and/or society. Id. at 290.
260. id. at 289.
261. See Susan L. Crockin & Nanette Elster, Cryopreserved Embr.os: Understanding
and Making Choices, 18 AM. J. FAM. L. 61 (2004); Noel Fleming, Navigating the Slippery
Slope of Frozen Embryo Disputes: The Casefor a ContractualApproach, 75 TEMP. L. REV.
345 (2002); Jill Madden Melchoir, Cryogenically Preserved Embryos in Dispositional
Disputes and the Supreme Court:Breaking Impossible Ties, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 921 (2000).
262. Inst. for Women's Health, P.LL.C. v. Imad, No. 04-05-00555-CV, 2006 WL

334013 (Tex. App. Feb. 15, 2006).
263. Id. at *1.
264. Id.
at **1,2n.1.
265. Id. at*1.
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appeals court reversed. 266 The couple claimed that because they were only
alleging simple negligence, no report was required, but the appeals court
disagreed and found that the couple was in fact alleging health care liability
claims, for which expert testimony would be required.267
Additional, and sometimes more complicated, cases have arisen over the
negligent destruction of embryos. 26 For example, one couple sued a clinic for
negligently destroying or losing five frozen pre-embryos that the clinic agreed
to store. 269 The couple brought several claims, including wrongful death,
negligent loss of irreplaceable property, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of
a bailment contract. 270 The trial court dismissed all counts, but the court of
appeals reversed as to all counts except the wrongful death claim. 271 The court
agreed there could be no wrongful death action because a pre-embryo would
not be categorized as a "person" under Arizona's wrongful death law.27 2 The
court allowed the couple to pursue their claims for the negligent loss or
destruction of the pre-embryos, relying on Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 323, which applies to people who fail to take reasonable care after
having agreed to protect another's person or property.273 The appeals court also
found that the trial court acted too quickly in dismissing the breach of fiduciary
duty count on the basis that it was barred by the state's medical malpractice
law.274 Further, the court found that there was a valid bailment contract between
the couple and the clinic and determined that the couple
should be allowed to
275
proceed with their claim that the clinic had breached it.
Other cases have involved spousal disputes over the use and disposition of
frozen embryos.276 For example, in a Massachusetts divorce case, the husband

266. Id. at **1, 3.
267. Id.
268. See Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005); see also
Frisina v. Women & Infants Hosp. of R.I., No. CIV. A. 95-4037, 2002 WL 1288784 (R.I.

Super. May 30, 2002) (denying plaintiffs' claims for negligent infliction of emotional
distress under Rhode Island law but permitting recovery for emotional distress due to breach
of contract, where hospital's in vitro fertizilation clinic lost or destroyed their frozen preembryos).
269. Jeter, 121 P.3d at 1258.
270. Id. at 1258-59.
271. Id. at 1259.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1272.
274. Id. at 1274-75.
275. Id. at 1275-76.
276. See, e.g., A.Z v. B.Z, 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000). See also In re Marriage of
Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003) (holding that any agreement between the parties would
be enforced, unless one of them later changed his or her mind and informed the clinic in
writing of that change. The court also declined to apply a balancing of the parties' interests
to determine what should happen with the pre-embryos, in order to leave the decision up to
the couple). These cases also have the potential to raise multiple conflicts issues since it has
become more common for couples to use clinics that are out of state, and/or to store frozen
embryos in out-of-state facilities.
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sought and obtained from a Probate and Family Court judge a permanent
injunction preventing his wife from trying to become pregnant via frozen preembryos made with the couple's genetic material and held at a fertility clinic
the couple had utilized while married. 77 At issue was the agreement278 the
couple had with the clinic as to what should happen to the frozen preembryos. 279 Both had signed a consent form indicating that if the couple
separated, the embryos would be returned to the wife for implantation. 80 The
Supreme Judicial Court, however, agreed with the trial judge that the husband's
interests in avoiding parenthood outweighed his former wife's interest in
having additional children.2 8 In deciding this issue of first impression, the
court found that the consent form was primarily meant to govern the couple's
relationship with the clinic and not to be a binding agreement between the
spouses if they later disagreed about the disposition of the pre-embryos. 82 The
court also found that the consent form used the word "separation," not
283
"divorce," and was not necessarily meant to govern a divorce proceeding.
Further, even if the agreement had been unambiguous, public policy would
2 84
prevent the court from forcing someone to become a parent against his will.
As such, the court found that prior agreements to enter into parenthood should
not be enforced when one of the parties changes his or her mind.285
As with most legal issues concerning embryos, religion and ethics become
important to the courts.286 In a Tennessee case, a couple divorced and disagreed
about the disposition of their frozen embryos; the wife wanted to donate them
to another couple while the husband wanted them to remain frozen.287 The
Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision that the pre288
embryos were "children in vitro" who should be allowed a chance to be born.
The court then noted that the couple had never made an agreement about what
should happen to the embryos; if they had, it would have been enforced.289
Absent such an agreement, however, the court looked to the relative interests of

277. Id. at 1052.
278. See infra notes 483-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of such
agreements.
279. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1053.
280. Id. at 1054.
281. Id. at 1057-58.
282. Id. at 1056-57.
283. Id. at 1057.
284. Id. at 1057-58.
285. Id. at 1059. See also J. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001) (noting that in the
event of a disagreement about the use of pre-embryos, the party wishing to avoid procreation
would ordinarily prevail; however, that analysis could change if one of the parties was
infertile, which was not the case here).
286. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
287. Id. at 589-90.
288. Id. at 594.
289. Id. at 597-98.
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the parties.2 90 In this case, the husband had grown up without a close
relationship with his parents and was opposed to having any of his children
grow up without both of their parents.2 9 ' He opposed the wife donating the preembryos because the couple who received them might divorce, so children the
husband considered to be his own could grow up in a single-parent home.292
The court found that his interests in avoiding parenthood outweighed his
former wife's interest in donating the pre-embryos.293 Importantly, the court
noted that ordinarily, the party seeking to avoid procreation will prevail, 294 as
least as long as the other party has reasonable alternative means of becoming a
parent. 95
In a case with a similar issue, a divorced couple disagreed as to what
should happen to two frozen pre-embryos produced during an attempt at in
vitro fertilization. 296 The wife wanted to implant the pre-embryos in a surrogate
mother and raise any resulting child herself. 297 The trial court applied a "best
interests of the child" standard in refusing that request and ordered the embryos
be given to the husband.298 The high court found the trial court's
characterization of the pre-embryos as a child to be questionable but declined to
get into the philosophical issue of how the pre-embryos should be
categorized.29 9 Instead, the court decided the case on the basis of the contract
the couple had with the California-based fertility clinic.300 The contract
provided that the pre-embryos would be thawed, but not allowed to undergo
further development after five years. 30 ' Those five years had passed, and the
court said it was not even aware of whether the pre-embryos were still in
existence.30 2 If they were, however, the terms of the contract would govern and
the pre-embryos would be thawed (essentially destroyed).30 3

290. Id. at 603-04.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 604.
293. Id.
294. Id. An interesting corollary to this is the use of technologies or surgeries to
prevent pregnancy. This could be thought of as "anti-reproductive" technologies. It is worth
discussing these procedures as well because these, too, give rise to lawsuits and can create
conflicts issues.
295. Id.
296. Litowitz v. ltowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002).
297. Id. at 264.
298. Id.
299. ld. at 269.
300. Id. at 268-69.
301. Id. at 268.
302. Id. at 269.
303. Id. at 270-71. A dissenting judge contended the majority misread the contractual
provision ordering the thawing of the pre-embryos and that it did not apply here. Further, the
dissenting judge said the majority's decision would call for the destruction of "unborn
human life," even though both parties wanted the pre-embryos to be implanted, although
they could not agree on who would receive them. Id. at 272-74 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
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In a terrible mix-up in New York, an embryologist mistakenly implanted
into a women's uterus two embryos: one was genetically hers, but the other
belonged to another couple. 3°4 Several lawsuits arose. 30 5 One suit was brought
by the genetic parents of the embryo implanted in the woman. 30 6 The court
rejected the defendants' arguments that the parents' malpractice claim had to be
dismissed because it sought recovery for emotional harm caused by the creation
of a human life.30 7 The court distinguished this case from a typical "wrongful
life" case with the difference being that the plaintiffs were deprived
of
30 8
experiencing pregnancy, parental bonding, and the birth of their child.
The second suit was brought against the same defendants by the woman
who carried the "twins;" she sued the embryologist for negligence over the
mistaken implantation into her uterus of an embryo genetically belonging to
another couple. 30 9 The plaintiff alleged she suffered physical and emotional
injuries, including having to undergo a C-section for the twin birth and having
to make difficult decisions as to whether to carry to term a fetus that was not
genetically hers. 310 Both the trial and appeals court found that the woman stated
a cause of action and the appeals court allowed her to recover as well.311
The third suit was brought by the genetic parents of the mistakenly
implanted "twin," seeking custody of him from the birth mother.312 The trial
court awarded custody to the genetic parents while granting the birth parents
visitation, and both sides appealed.31 3 The appellate court affirmed the award of
custody to the genetic parents but found that the birth parents lacked standing
to seek visitation.314 The court relied on the fact that the birth parents knew of
the mistaken implantation not long after it occurred but refused to correct the
mistake by immediately turning the child over to his genetic parents after
birth. 3 " The boy's "twin," though he had shared a womb with him, was not
genetically related to the boy and also lacked standing to seek visitation. 1 6 The
court also noted the public policy of New York to give parents broad rights to

304. Fasano v. Nash, 723 N.Y.S.2d 181 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Perry-Rogersv.
Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000); Perry-Rogersv. Obasaju, 723 N.Y.S.2d
28 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
305. Fasano v. Nash, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 181; Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d at
19; Perry-Rogersv. Obasaju, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 28.

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Perry-Rogersv. Obasaju, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
Id. at 29.
Id.
Fasano v. Nash, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 181.
Id.
Id.
Perry-Rogersv. Fasano,715 N.Y.S.2d 19, 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 24-25.
Id. at 25.
Id.
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exclude visitation, even by those people who have raised the child in question
as their own.3t 7
In this case, as in others, the facts could have just as easily crossed state
lines and been complicated by differences in the laws. Thus, it is important to
turn next to a discussion of those differences, and an explanation of the choice
of law approaches used to resolve them.
D.

Conflicting Laws: 50 State Reviews

To the extent that there is any legislative guidance in ART cases, it is
found on the state level. With many states changing their laws as technologies
evolve, there is great potential for inconsistency within a single state, not to
mention across state lines. The laws vary widely about all of the issues
discussed in the sections above, but two areas in particular warrant a more
detailed description because there has been legislation to address them:
surrogacy and disposition of embryos.
I.Surrogacy
State laws on surrogacy vary greatly: some expressly prohibit and some
expressly allow surrogacy agreements; some states have provisions that would
imply permission or forbidding of such contracts; and some have no provisions
at all. The chart below details the legal situation in each state:
State
Alabama

Law
§ 26IOA-33 designates
who is allowed to
place children for
adoption and makes it
a crime for others to
do so. Importantly, it
specifies that
surrogate motherhood
is not covered by the
law.318
Alabama has adopted
a modified version of
the Uniform
Parentage Act
ALA. CODE

Comments
No laws specifically authorize
surrogacy, but it is exempted from
the law criminalizing baby-selling.
The Alabama version of the UPA
leaves it to Alabama courts to
decide whether and under what
conditions surrogacy agreements
are valid. If a surrogacy agreement
is held invalid, an intended parent
who provided his/her own genetic
material for implantation should
still be able to prove paternity, but
intended parents who rely on
donated eggs/sperm will not be
able to do so.

317. Id. at 25-26.
318. See ALA. CODE § 26-1OA-33 (LexisNexis 1992). See also § 26-10A-34(c) (noting
that "[s]urrogate motherhood is not intended to be covered by this section" (which
criminalizes payments to a parent to consent to an adoption)).
319. § 26-17-101 et. seq. (LexisNexis Supp. 2008).
320. § 26-17-103(d).
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("UPA"), effective
39
January 1, 2009. 1
However, Alabama
chose not to adopt
Article 8 of the UPA,
which authorizes
surrogacy 320
agreements.

Alaska
Arizona

No statutes on
surrogacy.
Law prohibiting
surrogacy contracts
was found at least
partially
unconstitutional in
Soos v.2Superior
1

Soos was an appellate court
decision; the Arizona322
Supreme
Court denied review.

3

Court.

Arkansas

ARK. CODE ANN. §
9-10-201(b), dealing
with artificial
insemination and the
status of the
individuals includes
parentage
presumptions for
children born
through ART to
surrogates.323 ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-10201(c)(1) provides a
similar provision
regarding the status

Surrogacy contracts seem to be
allowed. The parentage
presumptions are as follows: "A
child born by means of artificial
insemination to a woman who is
married at the time of the birth of
the child shall be presumed to be the
child of the woman giving birth and
the woman's husband except in the
case of a surrogate mother, in which
event the child shall be that of: (1)
the biological father and the woman
intended to be the mother if the
biological father is married; or (2)
the biological father only if

321. Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). The portion
of the law found unconstitutional provided: "[a] surrogate is the legal mother of a child born
as a result of a surrogate parentage contract and is entitled to custody of that child." ARiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(B) (2007). The court based its decision on the fact that a
biological father of a child born through surrogacy could prove his parentage, but the
biological mother was not permitted to do the same, which violated the Equal Protection
clause of the U.S. Constitution. Soos, 897 P.2d at 1361.
322. Id., rev. denied (July 11, 1995).
323. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008).
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California

of unmarried
surrogates.324
ARK. CODE ANN. §
9-10-201(c)(2)
provides that the
woman giving birth
will be listed on the
birth certificate, but
in the case of
surrogate mothers a
substituted birth
certificate can be
issued upon order of
the court.325

unmarried; or (3) the woman
intended to be the mother in cases of
a surrogate mother when an
anonymous sperm donor's sperm
was utilized for the artificial
insemination."326

CAL. FAM. CODE §

No provisions specifically dealing
with the validity of surrogacy
contracts, but they have been
allowed by the courts. California
uses the "intent test" to determine
parentage of children born via a 329
gestational surrogacy agreement.

7648.9 mentions
surrogacy agreements
in the context of
saying that a law
allowing paternity
judgments to be set
aside does not apply
to children conceived
via surrogacy
agreements. 327 Courts
have said, however,
that the determination
of maternity in
surrogacy situations
is governed by the
same principles as
those governing
paternity in the
Uniform
Parentage
28
Act.

Colorado
Connecticut

3

No statutes on
surrogacy.
No statutes on

It is unclear whether Connecticut

324. § 9-10-201(c)(1).
325. § 9-10-201(c)(2).
326. § 9-10-201(c)(I).

327.

[Vol. 24:1

CAL. FAm. CODE

§ 7648.9 (West Supp. 2009).

328. See § 7600 et. seq. (West 2004).
329. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993).
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surrogacy.
Delaware
District of
Columbia

Florida

No statutes on
surrogacy.
Surrogacy
agreements are
prohibited, and any
person involved in
any such agreement
is subject to civil and
criminal penalties. 331

Married couples are
permitted to use a
gestational surrogate
under certain
circumstances, such
as when the
"commissioning
mother" cannot carry
to term or to do so
would create a health
risk to the mother or
the child.333

courts deem surrogacy agreements
enforceable.33 °

D.C. CODE § 16-401(4), defines
surrogacy agreements as follows:
(4) "Surrogate parenting contract"
means any agreement, oral or
written, in which:
(A) A woman agrees either to be
artificially inseminated with the
sperm of a man who is not her
husband, or to be impregnated
with an embryo that is the product
of an ovum fertilization with the
sperm of a man who is not her
husband; and
(B) A woman agrees to, or intends
to, relinquish all parental rights
and responsibilities and to consent
to the adoption of a child born as a
result of insemination or in vitro
fertilization as provided in this
chapter. '332
The statute reads, in part, "[p]rior to
engaging in gestational surrogacy, a
binding and enforceable gestational
surrogacy contract shall be made
between the commissioning couple
and the gestational surrogate. A
contract for gestational surrogacy
shall not be binding and enforceable
unless the gestational surrogate is 18
years of age or older and the
commissioning couple are legally
married and34 are both 18 years of age
or older.,

Georgia

3

No statutes on
surrogacy.

330. See Leslie I. Jennings-Lax, Surrogacy-The Law in Connecticut, 79 CONN. B.J.

59, 65-66 (2005).
331. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-402 (LexisNexis 1997).

332. § 16-401(4).
333. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(2) (West 2005).

334. § 742.15(1).
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Idaho
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Indiana
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No statutes on
surrogacy.
No statutes on
surrogacy.
Gestational surrogacy
agreements are
allowed by statute.335
The law contains
requirements for both
the surrogate and 336
the
intended parents.
Surrogacy
agreements are
deemed void and
contrary337to public
policy.

[Vol. 24:1

IND. CODE § 31-20-1-1, provides

"that it is against public policy to
enforce any term of a surrogate
agreement that requires a surrogate
to do any of the following:
(1) Provide a gamete to conceive a
child.
(2) Become pregnant.
(3) Consent to undergo or undergo
an abortion.
(4) Undergo medical or
psychological treatment or
examination.
(5) Use a substance or engage in
activity only in accordance with
the demands of another person.
(6) Waive parental rights or duties
to a child.
(7) Terminate care, custody, or
control of a child.
(8) Consent to a stepparent
adoption under IND. CODE § 31-19
(or IND. CODE § 31-3-1 before its
repeal)."33 s
See also IND. CODE . 31-20-1-2

335. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/1 et seq. (West 1993).
336. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/20 § 20(b). The gestational surrogate must be at
least 21, have given birth to at least one child, and have had medical and mental health

evaluations. At least one of the intended parents must have a medical need for surrogacy.
Surrogacy agreements also must be in writing and the parties must be represented by
separate counsel. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/20 § 20(a).
337. See IND. CODE §§ 31-20-1-1 to -2 (LexisNexis 2007).
338. See § 31-20-1-1.
339. § 31-20-1-2.
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Void agreements.
"A surrogate agreement described
in section 1 of this chapter that is
formed3 39after March 14, 1988, is
void.,

Iowa

Kansas

No specific laws
dealing with
surrogacy, but it is
specifically exempted
from statute making
it a crime to sell

IOWA CODE § 710.11 provides that:
"A person commits a class "C"
felony when the person purchases or
sells or attempts to purchase or sell
an individual to another person. This
section does not apply to a surrogate

another person.34 °

mother arrangement. ,,341

No statutes on
surrogacy.

Kentucky

Traditional surrogacy
agreements (where
the surrogate is
genetically related to
the child) appear to

No Kentucky law addresses
gestational surrogacy agreements.

be void. 342

Louisiana

Contracts for
traditional surrogate
motherhood are
void.3 43

Louisiana laws do not directly
address gestational surrogacy
agreements. However, the Vital
Records Law appears to allow
gestational carriers who are
genetically related to a biological
parent of the child. The law provides
in part that "[i]n the case of a child
born of a surrogate birth parent who
is related by blood or affinity to a
biological parent, the biological
parents proven to be the mother and
father by DNA testing shall be
considered the parents of the
child." 344

Maine

No statutes on
surrogacy.

Maryland

No statutes on
surrogacy.

A Maryland Attorney General's
opinion has declared surrogacy
contracts that involve a payment of a

340.

IOWA CODE ANN.

§ 710.11 (West 2003).

341. Id.
342. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007).
343. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (2005).
344. § 40:34B(1)j) (Supp. 2009).
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Massachusetts

No statutes on
surrogacy.

[Vol. 24:1

fee to the birth mother to be illegal
and unenforceable under Maryland
law. However, the same opinion said
the payment of a surrogacy fee
would not necessarily be a bar to an
adoption because the decision on
whether to grant an adoption petition
depends on the best interests of the
child.345
A traditional surrogacy contract was
held unenforceable by the
Massachusetts
high court in R.R. v.
6
34

M.H.

Michigan

Minnesota

Surrogacy contracts
are declared void and
contrary to public
policy, and criminal
penalties are set forth
for those who
participate in them.347
The law applies to
both gestational and
traditional surrogacy
348
agreements.
No provisions
specifically
addressing surrogacy.

There is a provision of Minnesota
law that allows an action to declare a
mother-child relationship, similar to
a paternity action.

Mississippi

No statutes on

345. 85 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 348, 348 (2000).
346. R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998), discussed in more detail infra at
notes 530-41 and accompanying text.
347. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.851 et seq. (West 2002).
348. See § 722.859, which states:
(1) A person shall not enter into, induce, arrange, procure, or otherwise assist in
the formation of a surrogate parentage contract for compensation.
(2) A participating party other than an unemancipated minor female or a female
diagnosed as being mentally retarded or as having a mental illness or

developmental disability who knowingly enters into a surrogate parentage
contract for compensation is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not
more than $10,000.00 or imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or both.
(3) A person other than a participating party who induces, arranges, procures, or
otherwise assists in the formation of a surrogate parentage contract for
compensation is guilty of a felony punishable by a fine of not more than
$50,000.00 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both.
349. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.71 (West 2007).
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~ surrogacy.

__

I No statutes

Missouri

I_

on

surrogacy.

________________

Trafficking in children is a crime,
but it's not clear if surrogacy would
fall under this law. 350 See Mo. REV.
STAT. § 568.175, which notes that a
"person... commits the crime of
trafficking in children if he...
offers, gives, receives or solicits any
money, consideration or other thing
of value for the delivery or offer of
delivery of a child to another person
...for purposes of adoption or a
consent to termination of parental
rights. . . .""' However, note that

"[a] crime is not committed under
this section if the money,
consideration or thing of value or
conduct is permitted under chapter
453, RSMo, relating to adoption. 352
Montana
Nebraska

Nevada

New
Hampshire

350.
351.
352.
353.
354.

No statutes on
surrogacy.
Surrogacy contracts
are void and
unenforceable, at
least when there is
compensation
involved.353
Couples married
under Nevada law are
allowed to enter into
gestational surrogacy
agreements as long as
the agreements
follow specific
requirements,
including specifying
the rights of all
involved. 3
Surrogacy
agreements are

See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 568.175 (West 1999).
§ 568.175.1.
§ 568.175.2.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1995).
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045 (LexisNexis 2004).
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New Jersey

allowed under certain
circumstances,
including those in
which all the parties
involved are age 21
or older and in which
the intended mother
is medically unable to
bear a child. At least
one of the intended
parents must supply
the sperm or the egg.
The intended parents
must be a married
couple.355
No statutes on
surrogacy.

New Mexico

No laws specifically
addressing surrogacy.

New York

Surrogate parenting
contracts, both
gestational and
traditional, are
contrary to public
policy, void, and
unenforceable.358
No statutes
addressing surrogacy.
Traditional surrogacy
agreements

North Carolina
North Dakota

A traditional surrogacy contract
providing for termination of a
mother's parental rights was found
void by the New Jersey Supreme
35 6
Court in Matter of Baby M.
N.M. STAT. § 32A-5-34 (1978),
relating to adoption, allows for
certain fees to be paid to a mother
but "[a]ny person who makes
payments that are not permitted
pursuant to the provisions of this
section is in violation of the
Adoption Act and subject to...
3 57
penalties.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 123
specifies civil and criminal
penalties. 359

See N.D. CENT. CODE, § 14-18-05:
"Any agreement in which a

355. See N.H. REv.
356.
357.
358.
359.

[Vol. 24:1

STAT. ANN. § 168-B:1 et seq. (LexisNexis 2001).
In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (N.J. 1988).
N.M. STAT. § 32A-5-34(C) (1978).
See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 1999).
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 123 (McKinney 1999).
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(surrogacy through
ART) are void, but
gestational surrogacy
agreements are
allowed.36 °

Ohio

No statutes on
surrogacy.

Oklahoma

No statutes on
surrogacy.

woman agrees to become a
surrogate or to relinquish that
woman's rights and duties as
parent of a child conceived
through assisted conception is
void. The surrogate, however, is
the mother of a resulting child and
the surrogate's husband, if a party
to the agreement, is the father of
the child. If the surrogate's
husband is not a party to the
agreement or the surrogate is
unmarried, paternity of the child is
governed by chapter 14-20. ' '36I
See also: N.D. CENT. CODE § 1418-08, which notes: "A child born
to a gestational carrier is a child of
the intended parents for all
purposes and is not a child of the
gestational carrier and the
gestational
carrier's husband, if
362
anv."
Ohio law allows a woman to bring
an action to determine her parentage
using the same standards as
3 63
paternity actions.
An Oklahoma Attorney General's
opinion said that a surrogacy
contract that provides for
compensation beyond the statutory
limits for an adoption would violate
the state's anti-child-trafficking law.
364

Oregon

No laws specifically
dealing with
surrogacy; however,
the law making it
illegal to buy or sell
a child exempts fees

See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.537:
"(1) A person commits the crime
of buying or selling a person under
18 years of age if the person buys,
sells, barters, trades or offers to
buy or sell the legal or physical

360. See N.D. CENT. CODE, §§ 14-18-05, -08 (Supp. 2007).
361. Id.
362. See also § 14-18-08.
363. See OtIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3111.17 (LexisNexis 2008).
364. 1983 Okla. AG LEXIS 41, **1, 7.
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paid in a surrogacy
agreement. 365

[Vol. 24:1

custody of a person under 18 years
of age.
(2) Subsection (1) of this section
does not:
(a) Prohibit a person in the process
of adopting a child from paying
the fees, costs and expenses
related to the adoption as allowed
inORS 109.311.
(b) Prohibit a negotiated
satisfaction of child support
arrearages or other settlement in
favor of a parent of a child in
exchange for consent of the parent
to the adoption of the child by the
current spouse of the child's other
parent.
(c) Apply to fees for services
charged by the Department of
Human Services or adoption
agencies ....
(d) Apply to fees for services in an
adoption pursuant to a surrogacy
agreement.
(e) Prohibit discussion or
settlement of disputed issues
between parties in a domestic
relations proceeding.
(3) Buying or selling a person
under 18 years of age is a Class B
felony.

Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina

,366

No statutes on
surrogacy.
No statutes on
surrogacy.
No statutes on

surrogacy.
South Dakota

No statutes on
surrogacy.

Tennessee

Surrogate agreements

See TENN.

CODE

365. See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.537(2)(d) (2007).
366. See § 163.537.
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are not explicitly
authorized, but a
statute says that
adoption by the
intended parents is
not necessary in the
case of surrogacy,
and defines
"surrogate birth. ' ' 367

Texas

367. See
368. Id.

"(48)(A) 'Surrogate birth' means:
(i) The union of the wife's egg and
the husband's sperm, which are
then placed in another woman,
who carries the fetus to term and
who, pursuant to a contract, then
relinquishes all parental rights to
the child to the biological parents
pursuant to the terms of the
contract; or
(ii) The insemination of a woman
by the sperm of a man under a
contract by which the parties state
their intent that the woman who
carries the fetus shall relinquish
the child to the biological father
and the biological father's wife to
parent;
(B) No surrender pursuant to this
part is necessary to terminate any
parental rights of the woman who
carried the child to term under the
circumstances described in this
subdivision (48) and no adoption
of the child by the biological
parent(s) is necessary;
(C) Nothing in this subdivision
(48) shall be construed to
expressly authorize the surrogate
birth process in Tennessee unless
otherwise approved by the368courts
or the general assembly.

Gestational surrogacy
agreements are
allowed, but
regulated. 369 The
intended parents must
be married to each
other, the gestational
surrogate's own eggs
must not be used, and
the agreement must

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 36-1-102(48) (2005).

369. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.751 et seq. (Vernon 2008).

HeinOnline -- 24 Wis. J. L. Gender, & Soc'y 69 2009

70

WISCONSIN JOURNAL OFLA W, GENDER & SOCIETY
not seek to control
the surrogate
mother's decisions
regarding her health
and the health of the
embryo. A
gestational surrogacy
agreement must be
validated by the
court. An agreement
that is not validated is
unenforceable
under
70
3

the law.

Gestational surrogacy
agreements are
authorized under
certain
circumstances. 37 1 The
intended parents have
to be married and the
parties to a
gestational surrogacy
agreement have to be
twenty-one or older.
The agreement must
be validated by the
court, and the
intended mother must
be unable to bear a
child without a risk to
her health or to the
health of the child.
The gestational
surrogate's egg
cannot be used in the
procedure. A
surrogacy agreement
that is not validated
by the court is
unenforceable.
Payment to the

Utah

370. Id.
371. See UTAHCODE

ANN.

§ 78B-15-801 etseq. (2008).
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Vermont
Virginia

Washington

surrogate is
allowed.372
No statutes on
surrogacy.
Gestational surrogacy
contracts are allowed
if approved by the
court, and if a
number of
requirements are met,
including that the
intended parents are
married to each other.
See VA. CODE ANN. §
20-156 to §20-165,
and in particular VA.
CODE. ANN. § 158.
Gestational
surrogacy
agreements are
allowed if there is
no compensation
involved. See WASH.
REV. CODE §§

26.26.210-.260. 375
"Any person,
organization, or
agency who
intentionally
violates any
provision of RCW
26.26.210 through
26.26.260 shall be
guilty of a gross
3 76
misdemeanor.

Importantly, Virginia has a statutory
choice of law provision which states
that Virginia law controls surrogacy
disputes brought in Virginia
courts. 37 4 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-157

Note that WASH. REV. CODE §
26.26.021 includes a a choice-oflaw provision governing surrogacy
agreements.
"(1) This chapter governs every
determination of parentage in this
state.
(2) The court shall apply the law
of this state to adjudicate the
parent-child relationship. The
applicable law does not depend on:
(a) The place of birth of the child;
or
(b) The past or77 present residence
3
of the child.
Further, Washington extends its
law even to surrogacy agreements
entered into in other states: "A
surrogate parentage contract
entered into for compensation,
whether executed in the state of

372. Id.

373. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to -165 (2008).
374. § 20-157.
375. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.210-.260 (West 2005).
376. § 26.26.250.
377. § 26.26.021.
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Washington or in another
jurisdiction, shall be void and
unenforceable in the state of
Washington as contrary to public
378
policy.
West Virginia

No specific
provision on
surrogacy, but it is
exempted from the
statute making babyselling a crime.379

See W. VA. CODE § 48-22-803:
"(a) Any person or agency who
knowingly offers, gives or agrees
to give to another person money,
property, service or other thing of
value in consideration for the
recipient's locating, providing or
procuring a minor child for any
purpose which entails a transfer of
the legal or physical custody of
said child, including, but not
limited to, adoption or placement,
is guilty of a felony and subject to
fine and imprisonment as provided
herein.
(b) Any person who knowingly
receives, accepts or offers to
accept money, property, service or
other thing of value to locate,
provide or procure a minor child
for any purpose which entails a
transfer of the legal or physical
custody of said child, including,
but not limited to, adoption or
placement, is guilty of a felony
and subject to fine and
imprisonment as provided herein.
(d) A child whose parent, guardian
or custodian has sold or attempted
to sell said child in violation of the
provisions of this article may be
deemed an abused child as defined
by section three, article one,
chapter forty-nine of this code.
The court may place such a child

378. § 26.26.240.
379. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-803 (LexisNexis 2004).
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No specific statutes
on surrogacy.
No statutes on
surrogacy.

in the custody of the department of
health and human resources or
with such other responsible person
as the best interests of the child
dictate."38
The law dealing with registration
of
38
births mentions surrogacy. 1

2.Embryo Disposition
The laws of embryo disposition are similarly varied and address a variety
of areas: "advanced written directives prior to the creation of frozen embryos;
embryo disposition in the event of divorce or death involving a couple that has
donated eggs, sperm or had embryos in vitro fertilized; options for disposition
of unused embryos,
including storage, disposal, donation to scientific research
38 2
and adoption.,
Here is a state-by-state summary of these laws:
State

Embryo Law

Alabama

No laws regarding embryo
disposition.

Alaska

No laws regarding embryo
disposition.

Arizona

No laws specifically deal
with storage or disposal, but
experimentation on human
embryos is prohibited.383

Arkansas

No laws deal with storage or
disposal of embryos, but
human cloning is
prohibited.384

Comments

380. Id.
381. See Wis. STAT. § 69.14 (2007-08).
382. National Conference of State Legislatures, State Laws on Frozen Embryos,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/embryodisposition.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2009).
383. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 36-2302(A) (2003).
384. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1002(1) (2005).
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Doctors must obtain

California

Embryos cannot be sold for
use in research, but only
donated.38 9

informed consent for use
of donated sperm and eggs.
That consent should
specify the disposition of
any unused genetic
material.385

The law governing
disposition of human
embryos requires that
infertility patients be told
they have the option of
storing unused embryos,
donating them to another
individual, donating them for
research, or discarding them.
Doctors must give each
partner a form setting forth
advance directives regarding390
the disposition of embryos.

Human cloning is
prohibited.386
It is illegal to use embryos,
eggs, or sperm in ways other
than those indicated by the
patient on a written consent
form.387 Violators face three
to five years in prison and a
$50,000 fine. Written
consent not required by
donors to sperm banks.388
I.

I.

Colorado

[Vol, 24:1

COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-4106 governs disposition of
embryos in the case of death
or divorce.391

"(7)(a) If a marriage is
dissolved before placement
of eggs, sperm, or embryos,
the former spouse is not a
parent of the resulting child
unless the former spouse
consented in a record that if
assisted reproduction were to
occur after a dissolution of
marriage, the former spouse
would be a parent of the
child.
(b) The consent of a former
spouse to assisted
reproduction may be

385. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2260(a), (b)(2) (West Supp. 2009).
386. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24185(a) (West 2006).

387.

CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 367g(a) (West 1999).

388. §§ 367g(c), (d).
389. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 125320(a), (c) (West 2006); § 125350 (West
Supp. 2009).
390. §§ 125315(a)-(b) (West 2006).
391. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-4-106(7)(a)-(b), (8) (West Supp. 2008).
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withdrawn by that individual
in a record at any time before
placement of eggs, sperm, or
embryos.
(8) If a spouse dies before
placement of eggs, sperm, or
embryos, the deceased
spouse is not a parent of the
resulting child unless the
deceased spouse consented in
a record that if assisted
reproduction were to occur
after death, the deceased
spouse would be a parent of
the child."'3 92

Connecticut

Human cloning is
criminalized.393 The law
also provides: "(c)(1) A
physician or other health
care provider who is treating
a patient for infertility shall
provide the patient with
timely, relevant and
appropriate information
sufficient to allow that
person to make an informed
and voluntary choice
regarding the disposition of
any embryos or embryonic
stem cells remaining
following an infertility
treatment.
(2) A patient to whom
information is provided
pursuant to subdivision (1)
of this subsection shall be
presented with the option of
storing, donating to another
person, donating for
research purposes, or
otherwise disposing of any

The statute also specifies
that: "A person who elects to
donate for stem cell research
purposes any human embryos
or embryonic stem cells
remaining after receiving
infertility treatment, or
unfertilized human eggs or
human sperm shall provide
written consent for that
donation and shall not
receive direct or indirect
payment for such human
embryos, embryonic stem
cells, unfertilized human
eggs or human sperm.
(4) Any person who violates
the provisions of this
subsection shall be fined not
more than fifty thousand
dollars or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
Each violation of this
subsection shall be a separate
and distinct offense. 395

392. Id.

393.

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §

19a-32d(b) (West Supp. 2009).
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unused embryos or
394
embryonic stem cells.",
Delaware

Delaware law provides that
if a couple divorces before
the placement of sperm,
eggs, or embryos, the
former spouse is not a
parent of the resulting child
unless he or she consented
in a record that if
reproduction occurred after
divorce, he or she would be
a parent of the child.
Consent to assisted
reproduction can be
withdrawn in a record at any
time before the placement of
the eggs, sperm or embryos.
That person is then not
considered a parent of the
child.396

District of
Columbia

No laws regarding embryo
disposition.

Florida

Disposition of embryos is
governed by FLA. STAT. §
742.17, which focuses on
the agreement between the
couple and the physician,
and absent that, leaves the
decision about embryo
disposition to the couple.398

See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit.

13, § 8-707, which provides
that if an individual who
consented to be a parent by
assisted reproduction dies
before placement of eggs,
sperm, or embryos, the
deceased individual is not a
parent of the resulting child
unless the deceased
individual consented in a
record that if assisted
reproduction were to occur
after death, the deceased
individual would be a parent
of the child.397

The Florida statute also
provides that "[a] child
conceived from the eggs or
sperm of a person or persons
who died before the transfer
of their eggs, sperm, or
preembryos to a woman's
body shall not be eligible for
a claim against the
decedent's estate unless the
child has been provided 399
for
by the decedent's will.

§§ 19a-32d(c)(1)-(2).
§§ 19a-32d(c)(3)-(4).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-706(a)-(b) (Supp. 2006).
§ 8-707.
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 742.17(1)-(2) (West 2005).
§ 742.17(4).
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Georgia

No laws regarding embryo
disposition.

Hawaii

No laws regarding embryo
disposition.

Idaho

No laws regarding embryo
disposition.

Illinois

No laws regarding embryo
disposition.

Indiana

No laws addressing embryo
disposition.

Iowa

No laws regarding embryo
disposition.

Kansas

No laws regarding embryo
disposition.

Kentucky

No laws regarding embryo
disposition.

Louisiana

Louisiana defines an
embryo as a human being,
bans research on human
embryos, and bans the sale
of embryos. The law gives
embryos the legal status to
sue. It also provides that if
the intended parents
renounce their parental
rights to the embryos, then
they are available for
"adoptive implantation."
The intended parents can
renounce their parental
rights in favor of another
married couple, but "only if
the other couple is willing

400.

IND. CODE ANN.

Human cloning is
criminalized in
IND. CODE § 35-46-5-2,
which does not apply to in
vitro fertilization. °°

§§ 35-46-5-2(a), (c)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008).
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and able to receive the in
vitro fertilized ovum. No
compensation shall be paid
or received by either couple
parental
to renounce
4 1
rights. 0
Maine

No laws regarding embryo
disposition.

Maryland

Disposition of unused
embryos is governed by
MD. ANN. CODE art. 83A,
§ 5-2B-10, which provides
that: "(a) A health care
practitioner licensed under
the Health Occupations
Article who treats
individuals for infertility
shall:
(1) Provide individuals
with information sufficient
to enable them to make an
informed and voluntary
choice regarding the
disposition of any unused
material; and
(2) Present to individuals
the option[s] [including]..
•[s]toring or discarding
any unused material; [and
dionating any unused
material for clinical
purposes in the
treatment
40 2
of infertility.•

Massachusetts

Under Massachusetts law,
I doctors must provide in

401. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121, :122, :124, :126, :130 (2008). The law also
provides that disputes regarding the custody of embryos shall be resolved based on the best
interest of the embryo, and actually gives inheritance rights to embryos that develop into live
births. Donated embryos do not retain inheritance rights from their genetic parents. §§ 9:131,
:133.
402. MD. CODE ANN., EcON. DEV. §§ 10-438(a)(l)-(2) (LexisNexis 2008).
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vitro fertilization patients
with information so that
they can make an informed
choice regarding the
disposition of embryos or
gametes remaining
following treatment.40 3
The doctor must also give
the patient the options of
storing, donating to
another person, donating
for research purposes, or
otherwise disposing of or
destroying any unused
embryos.4 °4
Michigan

403.

No laws specifically address
embryo disposition, but
non-therapeutic research on
live human embryos is
banned under Michigan
law. °5

MASS. ANN. LAWS

Human cloning is
banned.40 6
Under Michigan law:
(1) A person shall not use a
live human embryo, fetus,
or neonate for
nontherapeutic research if,
in the best judgment of the
person conducting the
research, based upon the
available knowledge or
information at the
approximate time of the
research, the research
substantially jeopardizes the
life or health of the embryo,
fetus, or neonate.
Nontherapeutic research
shall not in any case be
performed on an embryo or
fetus known by the person
conducting the research to

ch. 11 IL, § 4(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008).

404. Id.
405. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2685(1) (West 2001).
406. § 333.16274(1) (West 2008).
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be the subject of a planned
abortion being performed
for any purpose other than
to protect the life of the
mother.
(2) For purposes of
subsection (1) the embryo
or fetus shall be
conclusively presumed not
to be the subject of a
planned abortion if the
mother signed a written
statement at the time of the
research, that she was not
planning an abortion.4 °7
Minnesota

No laws addressing embryo
disposition.

Mississippi

No laws regarding embryo
disposition.

Missouri

No laws regarding embryo
disposition,

Montana

No laws regarding embryo
disposition.

Nebraska

No laws regarding embryo
disposition.

Nevada

No laws regarding embryo
disposition, but an aborted
embryo cannot be used
for a
40 9
commercial purpose.

New
Hampshire

No laws regarding embryo
disposition.

New Jersey

People undergoing fertility
treatment must be informed

No state funds can be used to
research human cloning
under Missouri law.40 s

The law regulates donation
for research:

407. §§ 333.2685(1)-(2) (West 2001).
408. Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.217 (West 2000).
409. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 451.015 (LexisNexis 2005).
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of their options for unused
embryos. 4 10 The law
provides that embryonic
stem cell research is allowed
in New Jersey.411 It also
provides that the physician
must provide the patient(s)
information and choices
about the disposition of the
embryos.41 2

"A person shall not
knowingly, for valuable
consideration, purchase or
sell, or otherwise transfer or
obtain, or promote the sale
or transfer of, embryonic or
cadaveric fetal tissue for
research purposes pursuant
to this act; however,
embryonic or cadaveric
fetal tissue may be donated
for research purposes in
accordance with the
provisions of subsection b.
of this section or other
applicable
State or federal
, 41 3
law.

i

i

New Mexico

No laws regarding
disposition of embryos.

New York

Informed consent for donors
to reproductive tissue banks
is required.414

410.
411.
412.
413.
414.

The informed consent must
include "notification of all
currently known ways in
which the donor's
reproductive tissue and
resulting embryos may be
used. If the reproductive
tissue bank accepts
reproductive tissue with
restrictions on the manner
in which embryos created
may be used, the consent
also shall include a
statement that the
reproductive tissue bank has
informed the donor that it
will make a good faith
effort to ensure that the
donor's restrictions are

N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2Z-2(b)(1)-(2) (West 2007).
§ 26.2Z-2(a)(I).
§§ 26.2Z-2(b)(1)-(2).
§ 26.2Z-2(c)(1).
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 10, § 52-8.8(a) (2007).
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respected, but that it cannot
guarantee that the recipients
of the reproductive tissue
will abide by the donor's
restrictions. 415
Also, embryos may only be
created via donor tissue at
the request of a specific
patient who wants
41 6to use the
embryos herself.
North Carolina

No laws regarding embryo
disposition.

North Dakota

No laws specifically
govern disposition of
embryos, but the law does
govern parentage
determinations of children
born via assisted
reproduction after death or
divorce. North Dakota law
provides that if a marriage
is dissolved before the
placement of sperm, eggs,
or embryos, the former
spouse is not a parent of
the resulting child unless
he or she consents in a
record that he or she would
be a parent if assisted
reproduction occurred after

See also N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-20-65, which provides
that if a person who
consented in a record to
assisted reproduction dies
before it is performed, he or
she is not a parent of a
resulting child unless the
deceased spouse agreed in a
record that he or she would
still be a parent even if
reproduction occurred after
death. 1 9

divorce.4 17

N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-2064 also provides that
consent to reproductive
technology can be
withdrawn in a record at

415. §

52-8.8(a)(3).

416. § 52-8.7(h).
417. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-64(1) (Supp. 2007).

418. §14-20-64(2).
419. §14-20-65.
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any time before placement
of eggs, sperm or
embryos. The individual
who withdraws consent is
not a parent of a resulting
child.4 1

Ohio

If an individual who
produced genetic material to
create an embryo dies, the
other genetic parent may
consent to donate the
embryo and then shall have
no parental rights or
responsibilities.42 °

Oklahoma

Embryos may be donated
from one married couple to
another.42' The donors are
then relieved of parental
rights and responsibilities,
and the donees are
considered the parents of the
resulting child.422

Oregon

No laws regarding embryo
disposition.

Pennsylvania

No laws regarding embryo
disposition.

Rhode Island

No laws specifically
regarding embryo
disposition, but
experimentation on embryos
is prohibited.423

South Carolina

No statutes regarding
embryo disposition.

OH-o REV.

CODE ANN.

Human cloning is
prohibited.424

§ 3111.97(D) (LexisNexis 2008).

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 10, § 556(A)(1) (West 2007).
§§ 556(B)(l)-(2).
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1(a) (2008).
§ 23-16.4-2(a).
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South Dakota

No statutes specifically
dealing with dispositions of
embryos, although research
on embryos is banned.425

Tennessee

No laws regarding embryo
disposition.

Texas

No laws specifically govern
embryo disposition, but
parentage is governed under
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
160.706, which provides
that if a marriage ends
before assisted reproduction
takes place, the former
spouse is not a parent of the
resulting child unless the
former spouse consented in
a record kept by a licensed
physician that if assisted
reproduction were to occur
after a divorce the former
spouse would be a parent of
the child. The law also
provides that the consent of
a former spouse to assisted
reproduction can be
withdrawn in a record kept
by a licensed physician at

425. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS

ANN. §§ 34-14-16

[Vol. 24:1

Research that destroys a
human embryo is prohibited
and punished as a
misdemeanor.426
Research that subjects an
embryo to substantial risk of
harm is also punished as
misdemeanor under S.D.
CODE ANN. § 34-14-17,
which also prohibits the sale
or transfer or transfer of
embryos for use in
nontherapeutic research.427
Human cloning is
criminalized.428

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §

160.707 provides that if a
spouse dies before the
placement of embryos, the
deceased spouse is not a
parent of the resulting child
unless the spouse consented
in a record kept by a licensed
physician that if assisted
reproduction were to occur
after death the deceased
spouse would be a parent of
the child.43 °

to -17 (2004).

426. § 34-14-16.
427. § 34-14-17.
428. § 34-14-27.
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any time before the
placement of the
embryos.42
No laws specifically govern
embryo disposition, but
parentage is governed under
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B15-706, which provides that
in the case of a divorce prior
to the placement of an
embryo, the former spouse
is not a parent of the
resulting child unless the
former spouse consented in
a record that if assisted
reproduction were to occur
after a divorce, the former
spouse would be a parent of
the child. That consent can
be revoked in a record prior
to use of the embryos. 43'

Utah

Vermont

No statutes regarding
embryo disposition.

Virginia

No laws specifically govern
embryo disposition, but
parentage is governed under
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158,
which provides that "any
person who dies before in
utero implantation of an
embryo resulting from the
union of his sperm or her
ovum with another gamete,
whether or not the other
gamete is that of the
person's spouse, is not the
parent of any resulting child
unless (i) imolantation

429.
430.
431.
432.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§

See also UTAH CODE ANN. §

78B-15-707, which provides
that a deceased spouse is not
the parent of a child born via
assisted reproduction unless
the deceased spouse agreed
in a record to be the parent of
the child if assisted
reproduction occurred after
death .432

In cases of divorce, "any
person who is a party to an
action for divorce or
annulment commenced by
filing before in utero
implantation of an embryo
resulting from the union of
his sperm or her ovum with
another gamete, whether or
not the other gamete is that of
the person's spouse, is not
the parent of any resulting
child unless (i) implantation
occurs before notice of the
filing can reasonably be

160.706(a)-(b) (Vernon 2008).

§ 160.707.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§§ 78B-1 5-706(l)-(2) (2008).

§ 78B-15-707.
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occurs before notice of the
death can reasonably be
communicated to the
physician performing the
procedure or (ii) the person
consents to be a parent in
writing executed before the
implantation. '433

communicated to the
physician performing the
procedure or (ii) the person
consents in writing to be a
parent, whether the writing
was executed before or after
the implantation. 434

Washington

No laws specifically relate
to embryo disposition, but
parentage determinations
are governed by WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.26.725,
which provides that if there
is a divorce prior to
placement of an embryo, the
former spouse is not a
parent of the resulting child
unless the former spouse has
consent to parentage in a
record. Consent may be
revoked in a record before
the placement of the
embryo. 3

If a spouse dies before
placement of an embryo, the
deceased spouse is not a
parent of the resulting child
unless the deceased spouse
consented in a record that if
assisted reproduction were to
occur after death, the
deceased spouse would be a
parent of the child.436

West Virginia

No laws regarding embryo
disposition.

Wisconsin

No laws regarding embryo
disposition.

Wyoming

No laws specifically govern
disposition, but parentage of
children born via assisted
reproduction is governed by
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2906, which says that if a
marriage is dissolved before
placement of embryos, the
former spouse is not a

433.
434.
435.
436.

VA. CODE ANN.

§ 20-158(B) (2008).

§ 20-158(C).
WASH. REv. CODE ANN.

§§ 26.26.725(1)-(2) (West 2005).

§ 26.26.730.
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parent of the resulting child
unless the former spouse
consents to parentage in a
record. That consent can be
withdrawn prior to
437
placement of the embryo.

PART TWO:THE MAIN CONFLICTS OF LAW APPROACHES AND
FAIL To ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE COMPLEXITIES OF ART

How THEY

I. THE APPROACHES

There are four leading approaches to conflicts of law:
438
1. Vested Rights (First Restatement) (used in about 13 states);
2. Governmental Interest Analysis (used in about 3 states) ;439
3. Better Law (used in about 5 states); 440

4. Most Significant Relationship (Second Restatement) (used in
about 27 states). 44'
This section describes each approach with a general overview; the next
section analyzes each approach in more detail in the context of the cases that
have relied on them to decide choice of law ART issues.
A.

Vested Rights (FirstRestatement)

The oldest approach to conflicts of law is known as the "First
Restatement" or "vested rights" approach. 442 Under this approach, the court is
charged with determining where the rights of the parties "vested." The
approach itself requires three steps: first, the court has to determine what area
of law is involved-essentially find the right box to fit the lawsuit. This
assessment requires a determination of whether the issue is substantive or

437. Wvo. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-906(a)-(b) (2007).
438. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2006:
Twentieth Annual Survey, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 697, 713 (2006). This list presents them in
roughly chronological order. Of course, it is simplifying the approaches a bit to say that there
are only four since there are additional partial solutions that have been proposed. For the
purpose of this article, these four approaches will be the focus because they are the most
widely used generally and because they are the ones that have been used to solve ART cases.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. This approach was described

in

the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW

(1935).
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4
procedural 443 and a characterization of the issue to select its topical area. "
Second, the court must find the rule for that particular area of the law: the
Restatement itself provided all of these rules. Finally, the court applies the rule
to that set of facts, to localize the case to a particular location.
Under the First Restatement, one of the paramount concerns is
territoriality. 44 5 It is the "where" of the vesting of the rights that is important.
However, in order to determine where the rights vested, the court needs to
know when they vested.446 Once this is determined, it is then usually a fairly
straightforward process to apply the law of that state.447

B.

Governmental Interest Analysis

The next approach to appear was interest analysis. Developed by
Professor Brainerd Currie in the late 1950s, this approach seeks to determine
areas where a choice of law is needed. 448 One innovation of this approach is
that the court does not need to determine at the outset the area of law with
which it is concerned; instead, the court needs to examine the law involved and
see whether a state has an interest in having its law applied. 449 Another

443. If the issues are procedural, the court will use its own law. For a classic
discussion of this, see Walter Wheeler Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict
of Law, 42 YALE L.J. 333 (1933).
444. For example, whether the case is about a tort or a conflict.
445. This is comparable to other legal developments where territory was paramount.
Compare, for example, the notions of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) with later
developments in jurisdiction.
446. The "where" aspect of a "when"-type territorial approach can be seen, for
instance, in a case about validity of a contract. Under vested rights, the court will use the law
of the place where the contract was formed. However, in order to know where that occurred,
the court must determine when it was formed: in other words, the court must determine the
last act necessary for contract formation. (This when/where confuscation is akin to the
current (2009) season of the television show, "Lost").
447. Although, as with anything in Conflicts, the application is not problem-free. First,
the court will use its own laws to "localize" a case, which means that if the rule asks for the
place of contract formation, the court will use its own rules for what is needed to have a
contact. Second, the issue of renvoi-the bane of students' existence-may arise: renvoi
raises the possibility that if a forum must use some other state's law, instead ofjust applying
the substantive law which applies to the case, the court will actually use the other state's
choice of law approach, and go through a second choice of law process (which may lead in
some other substantive law being applied). See In re Schneider's Estate, 96 N.Y.S.2d 652
(N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1950).
448. See Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws
Method, 25 U. Cii. L. REv. 227 (1958).
449. In teaching this topic, this author asks students to draw a line between the facts of
the case and the law involved. Then, they look at the law and figure out its purpose while
covering up the facts. I ask them to think about what facts they would want to see in that

state's column-what events needed to have occurred in the state-in order for that law to
apply. For example, if the law at issue is a "guest statute" type situation, as many cases have
been, the students must consider the policy involved. A "guest statute" regulates conduct
between a plaintiff and a defendant where an auto accident is involved. The statute might try
to prevent ungrateful guests from recovering from host drivers and/or might seek to prevent
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innovation is that the court is asked to make a choice of law only where there is
a real conflict, thus eliminating from consideration cases where there appears to
be a conflict, but there is not.
C.

Better Law

The third major approach that appeared chronologically is the "better law"
approach or, as some courts call it, the "choice influencing factors" approach.45 °
Developed by Professor Robert Leflar in the late 1960s, this approach lists five
factors that the court needs to consider:
1. Predictability of Results;
2. Maintenance of Interstate and International Order;
3. Simplification of the Judicial Task;
4. Advancement of Forum's Governmental Interest; and
5. Application of the Better Rule Of Law.451
The court is free to pick and choose among these five factors, but most
courts using this approach choose it because it allows for the court to select a
law that it has deemed to be the "better" law.452
D.

Most Significant Relationship (Second Restatement)

The Second Restatement approach is the most widely used of the four
approaches.453 Its focus is to seek out the state that has the "most significant
relation" to the case, using a number of topic-specific factors and, if the court
chooses, a presumption for that area of law. The court may also consult a list of
policy principles to determine which law should apply and/or to break a tie in

collusive lawsuits between passenger and driver. They might suggest that collusive lawsuits
are problematic because the driver's insurance company might be defrauded. Students next
examine what facts should be looked for in that state that are relevant to that purpose. The
students then list possible connections that would give the state an interest in the case: if the
driver is from that state, if the driver's insurance company is in that state, if the accident
occurred in that state. The state's interest is directly proportional to the number of
connections. The students must then uncover the connections they have listed in that state's
column: driver from state, passenger from state. Then, they do the same for the other state
(or states) involved in the suit and put a check mark by every state that has an interest. They
then step back and look at their results. If they find that only one state is "interested," they
see that it is a "false conflict." If two or more states are "interested," it is a true conflict, and
a secondary analysis is needed. If no state is interested, it is technically an "unprovided for
case," and the forum would simply apply its own law. This is depicted nicely in WILLIAM M.
RIcHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1993).
450. Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerationsin Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 267 (1966); Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing
Considerations,54 CAL. L. REV. 1584 (1966).
451. Leflar, Choice-Ihfluencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, supra note 450, at
282.
452. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Saari,203 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 1973).
453. See Symeonides, supra note 438, at 713.
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the fact-specific factor analysis. A fuller explanation of this approach appears
below. This outline provides the basic steps of the approach:
1. Determine area of law:
a. substance or procedure,
b. characterize.
2. Count up the Law Specific Factors:
For Torts:
a. Is there a presumption?
b. Look to factors in Section 145 to find most significant
relationship:
1) place of injury;
2) place of conduct causing injury;
3) domicile, residence, etc.;
4) place where relationship, if any, is centered.
For Contracts:
a. Is there express choice of law in the contract?
If yes, will apply unless:
1) no relationship to chosen state, or
2) public policy prevents its application.
b. Is there a presumption?
c. Look to factors in Section 188 to find most significant
relationship:
1) place of contracting;
2) place of negotiation;
3) place of performance;
4) location of subject matter;
5) domicile, residence, etc. of the parties.
d. Consider relevant Section 6 Principles:
1) needs of interstate system;
2) policies of forum;
3) policies of other states;
4) justified expectations;
5) basic polices underlying this field of law;
6) certainty, predictability & uniformity;
7) ease in determination.
e. Localize: apply the law of the state chosen.
II.

HOW THE

APPROACHES MISHANDLE

ART CASES

There have not yet been many cases where there is a choice of law
argument made,454 but enough have arisen to permit analysis, and as the above
discussion demonstrates, there is certainly potential for many more to arise.
454. This is different from the many interstate cases that have arisen. The cases noted
in this section are those where there was the potential for the law of more than one state to
apply, and one of the parties made that argument. In some of the cases described above, the
potential was there, but the argument was never made.
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Like single state cases, interstate cases have involved surrogacy
agreements, disposition of embryos, and parentage issues. Several of these
cases warrant additional discussion because they illustrate particular issues that
arise and problems with the choice of law approaches. Cases have been decided
under a variety of the approaches, and, as the analysis below demonstrates,
some cases have been decided in states that use a particular approach, but were
not necessarily decided using that approach.
A. Cases Decided in States That Use the Vested Rights/FirstRestatement
Approach

1. Kansas 4"
A recent case from Kansas indicates the difficulties that the First
Restatement approach poses for ART conflicts. 456 The mother of twins
impregnated by artificial insemination sought termination of the donor's
parental rights.457 The donor opposed the action and sought a declaration for

visitation and joint custody. 458 The issue was complicated by the fact that the

two were friends but had not made a written contract to govern the donation or
the parental rights of the donor. 459 The trial court dismissed the donor's suit,
and he appealed; the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed.460
There were several issues on appeal, including whether Kansas or
Missouri law should govern the dispute. 46' Both parties were Kansas residents,
the agreement to donate sperm was made in Kansas, and the twins were born
and lived there.462 The only action that occurred in Missouri was the actual
insemination. 463 This chart illustrates the multistate connections in this case:
State

MISSOURI

Connections to State Insemination procedure
took place.

455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.

KANSAS
Mother Donor Sperm
provided (no contract)
Children born

Kansas uses the vested rights approach. Symeonides, supra note 438, at 713.
In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025 (Kan. 2007).
Id. at 1029.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1030, 1044.
Id. at 1031-32.
Id. at 1032.
Id.
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No statute barring a
presumption of paternity
for a known sperm donor
to an unmarried woman;
paternity could be proved
by genetic test.
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"The donor of semen
provided to a licensed
physician for use in artificial
insemination... is treated in
law as if he were not the birth
father of a child thereby
conceived, unless agreed to in
writing by46the
donor and the
4
woman."

As soon as the children were born, the mother filed a petition in Kansas to
establish that the donor did not have any parental rights; the donor responded
with a paternity action that acknowledged his financial responsibility for the
babies and claimed his parental rights (joint custody, visitation, and others).465
The two actions were consolidated, and when the court heard the case, the
parties presented a choice of law conflict. 4 66 The mother argued that Kansas law
should apply because the contract was performed there when the insemination
occurred; the donor sought the more favorable (for him) Missouri common law,
which would presume paternity when the sperm donor is known to the
unmarried woman.467 Missouri has no statute on this, but Kansas law requires
that "the donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in the
artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law
as if he were not the birth father of a child thereby conceived, unless agreed to
in writing by the donor and the woman., 4 68 Due to this 469
harsher treatment of the
donor, the mother argued that Kansas law should apply.
The Kansas Supreme Court's finding that Kansas law should apply 470 was
not surprising; as the court noted, and as the above chart indicates, almost all of
the connections, and certainly all of the significant connections, were with the
state of Kansas. 47 The court noted that in contracts cases Kansas uses the First
Restatement rule of lex loci contracus:472 here, Kansas would be the place of
contracting because that is where the contract was made. 4 73 The court also
noted that Kansas has a slight preference for the lexfori approach, and that the
courts should apply Kansas
law unless there is a "clear showing that another
474
state's law should apply.,

464. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1114(f) (2000).

465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.

K.M.H., 169 P.3d at 1029.
Id. at 1029-30.
Id. at 1030.
KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 38-1114(0 (2000).

K.M.H., 169 P.3d at 1030.
Id. at 1032.
Id.
I.e., "the law of the state where the contract is made governs." Id. at 1031-32.
Id.
Id. at 1032.
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Surprisingly, the court also cited Section 287 of the Second Restatement
of Conflicts, which provides that "legitimacy ' 475 is determined by the law of
the state with the most significant relationship to child and parent.476 These
three elements together all pointed to Kansas law, which did not support the
donor's motion for parentage. 477 The court noted that "the parties are Kansas
residents. Whatever agreement that existed between the parties was arrived at
in Kansas, where they exchanged promises supported by consideration, and
[the donor] literally delivered on his promise by giving his sperm to [the
mother]. The twins were born in Kansas and reside in Kansas. The only fact
tying any of the participants to Missouri is the location of the clinic where the
insemination was performed. ' 47 Thus, the court denied the father's motion for
parentage.479
Even more surprisingly, the Kansas Supreme Court seemed to meld the
choice of law and constitutional concerns; the court used a "most significant
relationship" analysis as a proxy for the standard constitutional inquiry of
whether the state has a legitimate interest in applying its own law.48 0 Thus, the
analysis was still conducted following the vested rights approach, and the result
reached was not surprising given the balance of factors, but the court employed
an analysis that seems overly cumbersome given the basic facts of this case. As
will be discussed below in Part HI, this case could have been much easier.
2. Georgia

48 1

In a Georgia case the court was asked to decide whether a Florida
insemination contract was contrary to Georgia's public policy. 482 A Florida
woman had entered into a contract in Florida with a Florida man, in which the
man agreed to provide her with semen to be used in her attempt at artificial
insemination. 483 The woman conceived two children via artificial insemination
using the man's sperm, but one of them died at birth.484 After having the second
child, the woman moved to Georgia, where she filed a petition for
determination of paternity and child support against the man. He sought

475. Legitimacy did not seem to be the exact issue in this case.
476. Id. at 1032.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Id. at 1044. The court noted further that, in this case of first impression, Kansas'
law, including the "opt out" provision by which a sperm donor could assert his parental
rights via a written contract, is constitutional. Id. at 1039-42. The court focused on the fact
that until the donation is made, the would-be father has complete control to insist on his
rights via a written agreement. Id. at 1041. Two justices dissented on the ground that
parenthood is a fundamental right which cannot be waived by failure to obtain a written
agreement as required by statute. Id. at 1046-47 (dissenting opinion).
480. See id. at 1032.
481. Georgia uses the vested rights approach. Symeonides, supra note 438, at 713.
482. Brown v. Gadson, 654 S.E.2d 179 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).

483. Id. at 180.
484. Id.
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dismissal arguing that the agreement entered into by the parties relieved him of
the duties of parenthood, including child support.485 The trial court granted the
motion for dismissal; the appeals court affirmed.486 The primary issue on appeal
was whether the insemination contract entered into in Florida was contrary to
Georgia's public policy. 487 The appeals court held that it was not.488 The
agreement, entered into in October 2003, provided that the man would provide
his sperm to a fertility clinic in Tampa, Florida, and in return the woman
relinquished her rights to hold him "legally, financially[,] or emotionally
responsible for any child" resulting from the insemination.489 In finding that the
agreement did not violate Georgia's public policy, the court noted that the
Georgia Supreme Court had found that biological paternity does not equal the
responsibility to provide support in cases of artificial insemination. 490 Further,
the agreement was authorized by Florida law. 49 '
B. Cases Decided in States That Use the Governmental InterestApproach
1. New York 492
The issue of posthumous children has already arisen in an interstate
context. 493 For example, in one "only in these times" kind of case, a man
created trusts for the benefit of the issue of his eight children but specifically
excluded adopted grandchildren as trust beneficiaries.494 His daughter and her
husband hired a surrogate who would be impregnated with the husband's sperm
and a donor egg; this was done, and twins were born in California.495 With the
surrogate's consent, the daughter and her husband obtained a judgment of
parental relationship from a California court and then filed a declaratory
judgment action in New York to determine whether the twins were excluded
as
496
trust beneficiaries because of the trust language against "adoptions.,

485. Id.
486. Id. at 179.
487. Id. at 180.
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. New York's choice of law approach is difficult to classify. Dean Symeonides puts
New York in the "combined modem" column of his choice of law chart. Symeonides, supra
note 438, at 713.
493. See In re Doe, 793 N.Y.S.2d 878 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2005); c.f supra note 145
(discussing posthumous use of sperm); see also Kindregan, supra note 7, at 123 for an
excellent discussion of this case.
494. In re Doe, 793 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
495. Id. at 880.
496. Id.
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The court focused less on which law to use and more on whether New
York could refuse to recognize California's grant of parentage.497 The court
found that it could not.4 98 Noting that California's decision should be upheld in
New York, the court went on to say that California's decision to declare the
genetic father and his wife the "parents" of the twins was different, under
California law, than a declaration of parentage through adoption, because it
was done under the power of a statute different from the one that allows
adoptions.499

C. Cases Decided in States That Use the Better Law Approach
1. Minnesota 00
Recently, a Minnesota court was confronted with a complicated
situation50 1 that involved both paternity and maternity disputes, as well as a
conflicts of law issue. 50 2 A gay New York man 50 3 with HIV 50 4 wanted to have a
child. 50 5 Because of his circumstances, he felt his only option was to use in
vitro fertilization with sperm washing and a gestational surrogate. 50 6 His niece,
a Minnesota college student, offered to assist him.50 7 He discussed the process
with her and found sample surrogacy agreements online, one of which he used
as the basis for their contract.50 8
The opinion of the court indicates that the man sent the agreement to his
niece, and it appears-though does not state-that she signed it in

497. Id. at 881-82. This is similar to the focus of the Miller-Jenkins cases, discussed
infra notes 576-96 and accompanying text.
498. Id. The court cited Baker v. General Motors, 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) for the

proposition that public policy is not a bar to Full Faith and Credit. Interestingly, the public
policy objection is often used in the argument that states do not have to recognize same-sex
marriages entered into in other states. See Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors:
Implications for Interjurisdictional Recognition of Non-Traditional Marriages, 32
CREIGHTON L. REv. 147 (1998).
499. In re Doe, 793 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
500. Minnesota uses the Better Law approach. Symeonides, supra note 438, at 713.
501. In re Paternity & Custody of Baby Boy A., No. A07-452, 2007 WL 4304448
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2007).
502. Id. at *1.
503. He was an attorney, which may explain the sophistication and choice of law
provision of the contract. Id
504. The court is careful to note that he was in "excellent" health with a "normal life
expectancy." Id. at *I n 1. It leaves the reader to wonder whether had he been in poor health,
the court would have used some other factor-perhaps the interest of the child-to decide
not only parentage but also which law should govern.
505. Id. at *1.
506. Id.

507. Id.
508. Id.
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Minnesota.5 °9 More importantly, the contract that both parties signed provided
that: 1) it was to be governed by Illinois law; 2) the niece would carry the
man's genetic child (using his sperm and an egg from an anonymous donor);
and 3) she would give up any rights to the child.5" 0 The man agreed to pay her
medical expenses
and later orally agreed to pay her $20,000 for her services as
511
a surrogate.
The uncle and niece traveled to Illinois where his sperm was used to
fertilize an egg that belonged to an anonymous donor.51 2 They then traveled to
New York, back to the man's home, where the niece spent a few months. 513
However, at some point during the pregnancy the niece demanded more money
and the two had a falling out. 51 4 The niece returned to Minnesota, where the
child was born, and the man-the genetic father-filed a paternity suit in
Minnesota. 1 5
The trial court used the better law approach, 51 6 found that Illinois law
applied under this approach, and upheld the validity of the agreement.5 17 Thus,
it declared the plaintiff as the father and denied the defendant's alleged parental
rights. 518 The defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the court should have
applied Minnesota law, which presumably would have warranted a different
finding.519 Perhaps the niece hoped to use to her advantage the divergence 52in0
the laws and, specifically, Minnesota's silence on surrogacy agreements;
without a specific law to allow them, she might have successfully argued that
there should be no way to prove that such an agreement is valid and
enforceable and no way to overcome the presumption that the birth mother is
the legal parent of the child.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that Illinois law governed and
affirmed. 521 The trial court had made a factual finding that the niece had not
only not been coerced but had proposed the arrangement and refused her
uncle's offer to hire her an attorney. 522 Importantly, the court found that the

509. Id. at *2. For the Better Law approach-unlike the First or Seond Restatementthe question of where a contract was made is not relevant, so it may be that the court did not
need to discuss that issue.
510. Id. at *'1-2.
511. Id. at *2.
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. Id.

515. Id.
516. The appellate decision refers to this approach as "choice-influencing factors." Id.
at *3.
517. Id.

518.
519.
520.
521.
522.

Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
Id. ("Minnesota law does not address... GSAs.").
Id.
Id. at **1-2.
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Illinois choice of law clause was not an attempt to evade Minnesota law 523 and
that Minnesota law neither addresses nor prohibits gestational surrogacy
2
agreements. 1252
Thus, the court could decide the case using Illinois law.52 5 Under
Illinois law, the court found that while the Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act
would allow for enforcement of such an agreement, the Act was inapplicable
because it had gone into effect after the agreement. 526 However, the Illinois
Parentage Act allowed for the rebuttal of a presumption that the birth mother
was the legal mother and under this Act, such an agreement could be
recognized and enforced when, as in this case, the plaintiff could bring
sufficient evidence. 527 Thus, the appeals court found the gestational surrogacy
agreement was legally enforceable and did not violate the public policy of
Minnesota. 52 8 For choice of law concerns, it confirmed the (sometimes
disputed) notion that the parties could contract for the law that they wanted to
apply.
D. Cases Decided in States That Use the Most Significant Relationship
Approach/Second Restatement
1. Massachusetts

529

Massachusetts has had several cases that involve choice of law issues and
choice of law agreements.53 ° In a relatively early case, a father (R.R.) brought
suit against a surrogate mother (M.H.) seeking to establish his paternity and
arguing that she had breached their surrogacy contract .53 Both parties were
married to other people at the time of the surrogacy agreement; R.R.'s wife was
infertile while M.H. said her family was complete and she wanted to help
another couple have a child. 53 2 R.R. and M.H.-who lived in Rhode Island-

523. This attempt could be enough to invalidate an express choice of law provision. Id.
at *3.
524. Id. See also Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in

2007: Twenty-First Annual Survey, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 243, 301 (2007) ("Although
Minnesota law was silent on surrogacy agreements, certain statutes seemed to contemplate
them by, for example, protecting the rights of individuals who use assisted-reproduction
technologies, or providing a procedure for recognizing the father of a child conceived by
artificial insemination.").
525. In re Paternity and Custody of Baby Boy A., No. A07. 2007 WL 4304448, *3
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2007).
526. Id. at *7.
527. Id. at **7-8.
528. Id. at **8, 5-6.
529. Which uses the Second Restatement in most cases. See Symeonides, supra note
438, at 713.

530. See R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998); Hodas v. Morin, 814 N.E.2d 320
(Mass. 2004), both discussed infra.
531. R.R., 689 N.E.2d at 790.
532. Id. at 791.
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were put in contact through New England Surrogate Parenting Advisors and
entered into the surrogacy agreement in November 1996. 533
The agreement provided that M.H. would be artificially inseminated with
R.R.'s sperm and would give custody of the child to R.R. after birth.534 She was
to receive $10,000 in compensation, which she would be required to repay if
she refused to let the father take the child home from the hospital. 535 In her
sixth month of pregnancy, M.H. changed her mind and decided to keep the
child.5 36 Although a custody agreement had been worked out by the time the
case reached the Supreme Judicial Court, the court, in a case of first
impression, reviewed the trial judge's determination that the father was
likely
37
to prevail on his claim that the surrogacy agreement was enforceable.
The court first determined that Massachusetts law would govern, even
though the agreement provided that Rhode Island law would govern its

interpretation.53 8 This court found that Massachusetts law applied because the
child was conceived and born in Massachusetts and the mother was a
Massachusetts resident. 539 The court held that surrogacy agreements could be
valid under certain circumstances but also that any custody agreement 5 is
40
subject to a judicial determination of what is in the best interests of the child.
Using Massachusetts' adoption law as a guidepost, the court further found that
the surrogacy agreement was unenforceable because the agreement was
induced by money
and because the surrogate mother agreed to give up the baby
54 1
before her birth.

Another case from Massachusetts and one that probably best illustrates the
use-and problems-of the Second Restatement is Hodas v. Morin.542 The
plaintiffs were a married couple from Connecticut who had entered into a
gestational surrogacy agreement with a New York resident and her husband
wherein the New Yorker would serve as a surrogate for their genetic child.543
The chart below can help illustrate the facts of Hodas.

533. Id. at 792.
534. Id. at 793.
535. Id.
536. Id. at 793-94.
537. Id. at 793.
538. It is not completely unheard-of for courts, even those using the "modern" Second
Restatement approach, to ignore party choice of law provisions in a contract. Interestingly
neither side had asked the court to use Rhode Island law, id. at 795, quite possibly because
Rhode Island has no statute or case law on this issue.
539. Id.
540. Id. at 795-96.
541. Id. at 795. No consent would be valid before the fourth day following the baby's
birth. Id. at 796.
542. Hodas v. Morin, 814 N.E.2d 320 (Mass. 2004).
543. Id. at 322.
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Connecticut

NY

Massachusetts

Connections to the P's (couple)
Surrogate
state
Provided gametes
Implantation

Law in that state

Hospital designated
Baby to be, and was,
delivered
Massachusetts law
specified in contract
No stated position Strong policy
Provides for pre-birth
against such
orders naming the
on gestational
carrier agreements; agreements
genetic parents as the
allows for birth
(would expressly child's parents so that
certificates to
forbid it)
they do not have to
name someone
subsequently adopt
other than the birth
the child;
mother
Would uphold
agreement
*Note: case law; no
statute on point.

The agreement specified that the child would be born at a Massachusetts
hospital, apparently because it was the halfway point between the couples'
residences but also because Massachusetts law provides for pre-birth orders
naming the genetic parents as the child's parents so that they do not have to
subsequently adopt the child. 544 The couple, with no objection from either the
surrogate and her husband or the hospital, went to court in Massachusetts to
obtain such an order.5 45 The probate and family court judge, apparently
concerned about forum shopping, dismissed Hodas's complaint.5 46 The
Supreme Judicial Court vacated that order and remanded 5with
directions that
47
the genetic parents be named on the child's birth certificate.
The court's ruling primarily dealt with a choice of law issue; the court had
to decide whether to respect the choice of non-Massachusetts residents to have
that state's law govern their contract. 48 The court noted that Connecticut
apparently had no stated position on "gestational carrier agreements" but that
New York had a strong policy against such agreements.549
The court said that where the parties express an intent as to the governing
law for their contract, Massachusetts courts would generally abide by that
choice.55 ° More specifically, the court applied the Restatement (Second) of

544. Id.
545. Id. at 321.
546. Id.
547. Id. at 327.
548. Id. at 324.
549. Id.
550. Even though the court did not in R.R. v. M.H., discussed supra. The Hodas court
distinguished R.R. v. M.H. as follows: "That case concerned a surrogacy agreement where
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Conflicts of Laws, which presumes that the law chosen by the parties applies
unless
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the choice, and
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to the
fundamental policy of a state with a materially greater interest than
the chosen state and is the state whose laws would apply in the
absence of a choice of laws by the parties.5"'
The court concluded that Massachusetts had a substantial relationship to
the transaction because the child was to be born there and the gestational carrier
had obtained prenatal care at the Massachusetts hospital.552 Although the
agreement was contrary to New York's public policy, the court doubted that
New York's law would have applied in the absence of the contract provision
because parts
of the transaction took place in New York, Massachusetts, and
55 3
Connecticut.
The court noted generally that "ft]he gestational carrier agreement
implicates the policies of multiple States in important questions of individual
safety, health, and general welfare. 5 54 Like many courts before, this court
asked the legislature to provide more guidance in the area of ART.555
The court explained the difficulty posed not just by the parties'
connections to various states, but also by the significant differences in the laws:
Complicating matters is the fact that the laws of Connecticut, New
York, and Massachusetts, the three States that potentially could
govern the agreement, are not in accord. In Connecticut . . .
gestational carrier agreements are not expressly prohibited by, and
perhaps may be contemplated by, the recently amended statute
governing the issuance of birth certificates. New York . . . has

expressed a strong public policy against all gestational carrier

the genetic mother (not married to the father) carried the child, was required to consent to the
father's custody of the child prior to birth, and was to be paid $10,000 for being a gestational
carrier ....
The gestational carrier was a Massachusetts resident, the child was born in
Massachusetts, and the genetic father and his wife were residents of Rhode Island ....
Although the gestational carrier contract provided that 'Rhode Island Law shall govern the
interpretation of this agreement,' we applied Massachusetts law to invalidate the contract as
contrary to Massachusetts public policy." Id. at 325 n. 10 (citations omitted).
551. Id. at 325 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 187).
552. Id.

553. Id. at 326.
554. Id. at 324.
555. "Until and unless the Legislature speaks to the contrary, the Commonwealth's
paramount concern to protect the best interests of children requires that parties seeking
prebirth declarations of parentage or a prebirth order follow the procedures set out in
Culliton v. Beth Israel [765 N.E.2d 1133 (Mass. 2001)]." Id. at 327 n.16.
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agreements. Massachusetts . . . recognizes
agreements in some circumstances.

gestational carrier

The court engaged in the laborious analysis of the Second Restatement
approach. Under this approach, the party choice of law approach will usually
establish the "most significant relationship" to the case. 557 The Hodas court
acknowledged this as well.558 However, as allowed by the Second Restatement,
the court went on to conduct an additional analysis, to look for a connection to
the state beyond that of the law chosen by the parties.559
The specific provision of the Second Restatement on party choice of law
notes the following:
The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual
rights and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one
which the parties could not have resolved by an explicit provision in
their agreement directed to that issue, unless either (a) the chosen
state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction
and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or (b)
application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest
than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and
which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable
law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.560
The Hodas court interpreted and used § 187(2) as a two-tiered analysis,
first checking to see whether Massachusetts has a "substantial relationship" to
the transaction, and second checking whether applying Massachusetts law
would violate a fundamental policy of that state.56'

556. Id. at 324 (internal citations omitted).
557. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §

187 (1971).

558. 814 N.E.2d at 324-25 ("As a rule, '[w]here the parties have expressed a specific
intent as to the governing law, Massachusetts courts will uphold the parties' choice as long as
the result is not contrary to public policy.' Steranko v. Inforex, Inc., 5 Mass. App. Ct. 253,
260, 362 N.E.2d 222 (1977), citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187
(1971). See Morris v. Watsco, Inc., 385 Mass. 672, 674, 433 N.E.2d 886 (1982)
('Massachusetts law has recognized, within reason, the right of the parties to a transaction to
select the law governing their relationship.').").
559. Hodas, 814 N.E.2d at 325 ("The Restatement similarly presumes that the law the
parties have chosen applies, unless "(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the
parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or (b)
application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a
state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state" and is the State whose law
would apply under § 188 of the Restatement "in the absence of an effective choice of law by
the parties." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)).
560. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)).

561. Hodas, 814 N.E.2d at 325.
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On the first prong, the court found that the parties' chosen law-that of
Massachusetts- could govern because Massachusetts had a "substantial
relationship" to the transaction. 562 The court noted, "that substantial
relationship is anchored in the parties' negotiated agreement for the birth to
occur at a Massachusetts hospital and for a Massachusetts birth certificate to
issue, and bolstered by the gestational carrier's receipt of prenatal
care at a
563
Massachusetts hospital in anticipation of delivery at that hospital.
What is interesting is that the court did not give a presumption to the
chosen law, but instead looked for a substantial relationship despite the fact that
the law had been provided. This makes this court's analysis under the Second
Restatement more cumbersome than it needed to be: it could have relied more
easily on the chosen law. Moreover, in an excellent legal move, the attorneys
involved may have anticipated that Massachusetts would look for a connection
beyond just the law of Massachusetts being chosen andfor that reason decided
that the baby should be born in Massachusetts. This demonstrates a "best
practice" for lawyers, to be sure, but certainly creates a confusing and counterintuitive solution for the actual parties involved.
On the second prong, the court noted, "it is a close question whether
applying the parties' choice of law would be 'contrary to a fundamental policy'
of another state with a materially greater interest.

564

Certainly the interests of New York and Connecticut are material and
significant, for the contracting parties reside in these States.
Nevertheless, the interests of New York and Connecticut may be at
cross-purposes here. New York, the home of the gestational carrier
and her husband, expressly prohibits gestational carrier agreements
in order to protect women against exploitation as gestational carriers
and to protect the gestational carrier's potential parental rights .....
New York has thus expressed a "fundamental policy" on a matter in
which it has a great interest. Connecticut

. .

. is silent on the question

of gestational carrier agreements, but in any event does not expressly
prohibit the plaintiffs from entering into such an arrangement.
Massachusetts also has interests here, including interests in
"establishing the rights and responsibilities of parents [of children
born in Massachusetts] as soon as is practically possible" and
"furnishing a measure of stability and protection to children born
through such gestational surrogacy arrangements.56 5

562. Id.
563. Id. The court noted under Restatement section 187 comment f, the "place of
partial performance considered to be sufficient to establish a reasonable basis for the parties'
choice of law." Id.
564. Id.
565. Id. at 325-26. The court in Hodas was careful to note: "We are concerned here
only with those portions of the gestational carrier agreement that pertain to the choice of
Massachusetts law and the complaint to establish parentage and for a prebirth order. We
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Even more surprisingly, the court then went on to consider the factors of
Section 188 of the Second Restatement, which are usually used in the absence
of a specific choice of law provision. The court found the analysis of these
factors inconclusive, noting that:
For example, the "place of contracting" and the "place of
negotiation" . . . are both unknown, although presumably these
activities took place in New York or Connecticut, or both. The "place
of performance,"

. . . arguably is the intended place of birth

(Massachusetts), or the place of prenatal care (at least partly in
Massachusetts), or the place where the pregnancy evolved (New
York), or the place where the genetic carrier was inseminated
(Connecticut), or any combination of these. The location of the
"subject matter of the contract,"

. . .

is equally difficult to determine,

and the final consideration, the "domicil" of566the parties (New York or
Connecticut) . . . in this case is not helpful.
This analysis indicates precisely the problem with the Second Restatement
approach: too many of the factors cannot be analyzed when discussed in the
context of an ART situation. One solution to this may be to have more
presumptions in the Restatement itself-for example, to have a presumption
that states that in a surrogacy contract, the "place of performance" is the place
of birth-but any such presumption would likely be arbitrary. Moreover, as
with all presumptions, such a presumption could defeat the advantage of
flexibility in reasoning that the Second Restatement provides. These concerns
are addressed further in the next section.
In Hodas, after all of that reasoning, the court concluded that whether
New York had an interest or not "it is doubtful that the principles of § 188
5 67
would result in application of New York law to this particular contact.
Given that, the court finally concluded that the judge should have applied
5 68 the
law of Massachusetts-the law chosen by the parties-to decide the case.
5 69

2. Illinois

In a case that reached a somewhat opposite result from Hodas, an Illinois
court used the Second Restatement and decided that a dispute should have been
have not been asked to express an opinion-nor do we do so--on the validity, construction,
or enforceability of any other provision of the gestational carrier agreement." Id. at 324 n.7.
566. Id. at 326 (internal citations omitted).
567. Id.
568. Id. at 327. The court, it should be noted, felt comfortable in its conclusion and

reasoning: "Although the judge in her decision prudently raised the issue of forum shopping
in declining to consider the complaint, we are satisfied that, in the circumstances of this case,
the parties' choice of law is one we should respect. We are also satisfied that our established
conflict of laws analysis will work to prevent misuse of our courts and our laws." Id.
569. Illinois uses the Second Restatement. Esser v. McIntyre, 661 N.E.2d 1138, 1141
(111.1996). See Symeonides, supra note 438, at 713.
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determined under Florida law, despite the fact that the parties had stipulated
that the question would be decided under Illinois law.57 ° The case concerned
the parentage of a child born during the marriage of an Illinois couple after the
wife was artificially inseminated while the couple was living in Florida.5 7' The
wife later brought a divorce action in Illinois seeking support for the child, but
the husband denied parentage of the son.572 The trial court awarded child
support, finding that John was estopped from denying parentage of the child;
the appeals court affirmed, but the high court reversed. 573 The court noted that
Florida and Illinois have somewhat different statutes regarding the parentage of
children born via artificial insemination, and the court found the use of Illinois
law here was customary to typical choice of law rules, which state that the law
governing legitimacy will be the law
of the state which has the most significant
574
relationship to the child and parent.
E. Case Decided In Two States
1. Virginia

75

and Vermont

576

One of the most recent, and quite controversial, cases to illustrate a
conflicts issue springing from ART is a parentage case that arose from a samesex relationship.5 77 Two women-Janet and Lisa-were partners in a lesbian
relationship from 1998 to 2003.578 For most of that time, they lived in Virginia,
but they entered into a civil union, as allowed under Vermont law,579 in 2000.580
They returned to Virginia after that, and in 2002 decided to have a child
together and went through intrauterine insemination; Lisa was inseminated with

570.
571.
572.
573.

In reMarriage of Adams, 551 N.E.2d 635 (111.1990).
Id.
Id. at 635-36.
Id. at 637, 640.

574. Id. at 639.
575. Virginia uses the First Restatement approach. See Symeonides, supra note 438, at
713.
576. Vermont uses the Second Restatement approach. See id. See also Myers v.
Langlois, 721 A.2d 129, 130 (Vt. 1998), cited in Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d
951, 971 (Vt. 2006).
577. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330 (Va. Ct. App. 2006), appeal
after remand No. 0688-06-04, 2007 WL 1119817 (Va. Ct. App. Apr 17, 2007), affd 661
S.E.2d 822 (Va. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 726 (2008). See also A.K v. N.B., No.
2070086, 2008 WL 2154098 (Ala. Civ. App. May 23, 2008) (finding that Alabama would
not reconsider a California judgment in which a natural mother tried to appeal a decision that
had granted visitation rights with a child conceived through ART to her former lesbian
partner); note that Alabama uses the Vested Rights Approach. See Symeonides, supra note

438, at 713.
578. Miller-Jenkins,661 S.E.2d at 824.
579. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 et seq. (LexisNexis 2002).

580. Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d at 824.
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anonymous donor sperm and carried and gave birth to their daughter, I.M.J. 581
Shortly thereafter, they moved to Vermont, but split up in 2003.82 Lisa took
their daughter and moved back to Virginia.
In November 2003, Lisa filed a petition in a Vermont court seeking to
dissolve their civil union and to gain custody of their daughter; the court
dissolved the union and granted Lisa custody and Janet visitation rights. 84 Not
content with this, on July 1, 2004, 58 Lisa filed a petition in a Virginia court
seeking sole custody.586 Six days later, Janet filed a motion in a Vermont court
"seeking enforcement of the Vermont custody order and a determination that
Lisa was in contempt. 587
The Vermont court entered an order that it had continuing jurisdiction
over the custody dispute, but the Virginia court entered an order awarding
temporary sole custody to Lisa.588 Since this case was proceeding
simultaneously in Vermont and Virginia, Janet continued her appeals in
Vermont. "Subsequently, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of
the lower court, specifically holding that, because Vermont had continuing
custody jurisdiction under the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act (PKPA),589
Virginia lacked jurisdiction to entertain Lisa's parentage action. Thus, Vermont
did not have to recognize the Virginia judgment, which itself had improperly
denied recognition to the previous Vermont judgment." 590
Lisa continued her case in Virginia, and the Virginia Court of Appeals
held that the Vermont order should stand. 59' In June 2008, the Virginia
Supreme Court held that the biological mother could not appeal the Virginia
Court of Appeals' reinstatement of the Vermont child custody order and that
the non-biological
mom, and former partner, should thus continue to have
5 92
visitation rights.

581. Id.

582. Id.
583. Id.
584. Id.
585. As one website explains, "[o]n July 1, 2004, the Virginia Affirmation of Marriage
Act became law. That law states that Virginia is prohibited from recognizing out-of-state
civil unions. Unhappy with the ruling of the Vermont court, Lisa filed in Virginia on July 1
because she hoped that a Virginia judge would use the Affirmation of Marriage Act to strip
Janet's parental fights." EQUALITY VIRGINIA, FAQ: MILLER-JENKINS V. MILLER- JENKINS,
http://www.equalityvirginia.org/site/DocServer/MillerJenkinsFAQ7.1 5.08.pdf?doclD=361
(last visited Apr. 20, 2009).

586. Miller-Jenkins,661 S.E.2d at 824.
587. Id.
588. Id.
589. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006).
590. Symeonides, supra note 524, at 302.
591. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 337-38 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
592. Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d at 827. This holding was based on the law of the case
doctrine; because Lisa had failed to perfect her appeal from the prior Virginia Court of
Appeals ruling, she was barred from challenging that ruling in a subsequent appeal. Id. at
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One of Lisa's arguments in the Vermont Supreme Court was that Janet
could not be considered a parent of I.M.J. because she lacked a biological
relationship with the child. 593 The court rejected that argument, relying in part
on a string of cases giving parental status to the husbands of women who are
inseminated by anonymous donors.594 The court also noted that a growing
number of courts have recognized parental rights for same-sex partners of those
who adopt children or conceive via artificial insemination. 95 Lisa did not
preserve for appeal an argument that Janet's parental status should have been
determined under Virginia law, and the Vermont Supreme Court, using its
choice of law approach, found that Vermont law applied:
We have a similar response to Lisa's argument that Janet's parental
status must be determined under Virginia law, Again, the argument
was not preserved below. In any event, we also reject this argument.
We have adopted the "most significant relationship" test of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 287 (971) in
determining choice of law questions. As we held in the first section,
the Vermont court had jurisdiction to adjudicate custody and
visitation of IMJ under both the PKPA and the UCCJA. Although
these acts primarily determine jurisdiction, their provisions are such
that they establish the state with the most significant relationship to a
child custody or visitation dispute. Accordingly, we conclude that
where jurisdiction is exercised consistent with the PKPA and
UCCJA, the law of the forum state is applicable. In this case,
Vermont had jurisdiction under both statutes, and, accordingly,
Vermont law applies here.596

The significance of Miller-Jenkins is not just in how the case proceeded
but in the fact that the court separated any discussion of recognition of civil
unions from its analysis of whether a custody agreement (made upon the
dissolution of such a union) would stand. Moreover, the decision of the
courts-in particular, Virginia's and the U.S. Supreme Court's decision not to
accept certiorarion this case--comfortingly reinforce the basic principle that
the PKPA and the Full Faith and Credit clause will continue to require courts to
recognize parentage and custody determinations made in other states.
Unfortunately, cases where a decision has already been reached are only a
small part of the panoply of cross-border ART cases. Additionally, even if we
can answer the question of recognition of judgments, the original court

826. Lisa's petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court was recently denied. 129 S. Ct.
726 (2008).
593. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins,912 A.2d 951, 965-68 (Vt. 2006).
594. Id. at 970.
595. Id. at 972.
596. Id. at 971 (internal citations omitted).
HeinOnline -- 24 Wis. J. L. Gender, & Soc'y 106 2009

2009]

INTERSTATE INTERCOURSE

oftentimes must still make a difficult decision. For that reason, the next section
suggests some solutions to those very difficult determinations.
PART THREE: SOLUTIONS TO

ART CONFLICTS

AND COMPLEXITIES

As discussed above, ART poses problems for a variety of legal models
because it breaks up the traditional units of "person" and "family" into smaller
components than those traditionally contemplated by the choice of law
approaches. The laws differ widely on many of the issues, and no choice of law
approach is precisely tailored to solving this problem. This raises the question
of what can be done, and this section analyzes several solutions.
I.

UNIFORM LAWS

The obvious way to eliminate choice of law problems is to eliminate
conflicts themselves. Put simply, if the laws are uniform, then conflicts among
them simply won't arise. Thus, laws like the Uniform Parentage Act 597 and the
ABA's recent Model ART Act5 98 could- and should-be useful in preventing
conflicts issues.
Unfortunately, neither Act has yet--or seems likely to-solve the wide
range of issues that confront the courts. The history of the UPA has been very
mixed. The UPA in its current form indicates revisions and a complicated
history. It has been controversial and not all of its provisions have achieved
even close to uniform adoption. For example, one of its provisions would
clarify problems with surrogacy:
Article 8 of the UPA (2000), which has since been revised in 2002,
attempts to clarify legal parenting of a child born as the result of a
gestational agreement. Article 8 recognizes that conception through
surrogacy is here to stay so, unlike the USCACA, it does not give
states the option of outlawing surrogacy outright. 599

The article goes on to point out the exact difficulty of this section and the
UPA overall by noting that "any state remains free not to enact the UPA
(2000), to enact it without Article 8, or to enact it with a modified version of
Article 8."600
Recent articles have outlined other problems with the Act, including, inter
alia, its problems in addressing the rights of stepmothers 60 ' and its lack of

597. See Uniform Parentage Act (1973), 9B U.L.A. 377 (2001 & Supp. 2006).
598. MODEL ART AcT, supra note 2.
599. Robert E. Rains, What The Erie "Surrogate Triplets" Can Teach State
LegislaturesAbout The Need To Enact Article 8 Of The Uniform ParentageAct (2000), 56
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1, 33 (2008).
600. Id.
601. Megan S. Calvo, Uniform Parentage Act-Say Goodbye to Donna Reed:
Recognizing Stepmothers' Rights, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 773 (2008).
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attention to issues of assisted reproductive technology and the complicated
problems this creates.60 2
The lack of comprehensive coverage in, and lack of uniform adoption of,
the UPA indicate that this act itself does not-and cannot-solve ART
problems or conflicts. In partial response to this gap, and to address other issues
that the UPA does not even contemplate, the ABA House of Representatives,
after much discussion, finally passed the ABA Model Act Governing Assisted
Reproductive Technology ("ART Act") in February 2008.603 In the ART Act,
the ABA notes,
It is the purpose of this Act to give assisted reproductive
technology (ART) patients, participants, parents, providers, and the
resulting children and their siblings clear legal rights, obligations,
and protections. These goals are accomplished by establishing legal
standards for the use, storage, and other disposition of gametes and
embryos by addressing societal concerns about ART, such as
clarifying issues of health insurance coverage for the treatment of
infertility and by establishing legal standards for informed consent,
reporting, and quality assurance.60 4
The ART Act is quite comprehensive in scope. It covers areas from
informed consent, 60 5 mental health consultations, 60 6 and privacy 6°7 to the needed
topics of payment to donors and gestational carriers, 60 8 health insurance, 60 9 and
quality assurance.61 0 It also delves into the difficult topics of embryo transfer
and disposition 61 1 and the status of children of assisted reproduction and the
sperm and egg donors.61 2 The ART Act, however, does note that it may actually
conflict with provisions of the UPA, and urges caution:
It is not the intent of this Act to conflict with or supersede provisions
of the Uniform Parentage Act or applicable intestacy provisions of
the Uniform Probate Code. Accordingly, any state or territory
considering adoption of this Act should review its statutes to
determine if those uniform acts have been adopted in that jurisdiction

602. Mary Patricia Byrn, From Right to Wrong: A Critique of the 2000 Uniform

ParentageAct, 16 UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 163 (2007).
603. See MODEL ART AcT, supra note 2.
604. Preface to MODEL ART AcT, supra note 2.
605. MODEL ART ACT, supra note 2, art. 2.
606. Id. art. 3.
607. Id. art. 4.

608.
609.
610.
611.
612.

Id. art. 8.
Id. art. 9.
Id. art. 10.
Id. art. 5.
Id. art. 6.
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and, if so, to refer to those existing provisions rather than enacting

this Article 6.613
However, when it focuses on gestational agreements, the ART Act
actually contains two alternatives.6 14 One requires a judicial proceeding, while
the other does not. Here, too, there is the possibility of deference to the UPA,
just as in Article 6. The ABA explains it as follows:
Since the gestational agreement provisions of the Uniform Parentage
Act are bracketed and, therefore, optional, an alternative procedure to
determine parentage in a gestational surrogacy arrangement is
offered that does not require a judicial proceeding if, and only if, the
parties comply with all of the other procedural protections of the
statutory alternative. The judicial preauthorization model is offered
as Alternative A, and the administrative model is offered as
Alternative B.615
Again, the possibility of alternatives on a difficult topic makes the ART
Act instantly less able to create uniformity.
The history of the UPA and other acts also indicates that states are not
likely to adopt the Act, or all portions of it, or adopt it in a uniform fashion. The
possible inconsistencies between the UPA and the ART Act may also breed
confusion and will likely ensure that conflicts will remain. Further, even if
states adopt similar provisions of the ART Act, there are likely to be
differences in interpretation and application.61 6 Moreover, states may be
reluctant to consider a Model Act in an area as sensitive and emotionally and
politically loaded as this one.61 7 Regardless of whether any Model Acts are
adopted, the need for sound choice of law principles to decide disputes will
remain. It is quite possible that greater uniformity in the laws will contribute to
the interstate aspect of ART.
II.

PARTY CHOICES TO MINIMIZE CONFLICTS

Another possible solution is to allow patients and doctors to contract for
specific choices of law to apply to their interactions. Choice of law provisions
in contracts generally are now quite common; however, the idea of contracting
for a choice of law clause in anticipation of a tort action is a newer idea. There

613. Id. legislative note.
614. Id. art. 7.
615. Id. at 188.
616. The lessons learned with the UPA indicate this, if nothing else.
617. One need only look at the arena of same-sex marriages to see the issues that arise.
For an excellent discussion of that issue, see Mark E. Wojcik, The Wedding Bells Heard
Around the World: Years From Now, Will We Wonder Why We Worried About Same-Sex

Marriage?,24 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 589 (2004). Moreover, the topics discussed throughout the
ART Act-surrogacy, embryo-disposition, etc.-indicate that states do not naturally tend
toward a uniform approach to these very difficult questions.
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have been several approaches to allowing for party autonomy in torts cases.
One is to let parties choose a state's law in their contract; this is analyzed
below. Another option is the idea of letting the parties choose the law to govern
their dispute post-occurrence, but pre-litigatiorL61 8 The reason that the latter
does not need much discussion is because it is still used extremely rarely and
assumes that parties can agree. In some ways, this is no different than having
one party allege that a particular law should apply and having the other party
not contest that particular issue.
The idea of choice of law provisions in medical contracts as potentially
governing tort actions is not unique to ART. There is no reason why such
provisions cannot be more commonplace, except for several concerns. First,
such provisions so clearly anticipate litigation that they may make both the
doctor and the patient uncomfortable. Second, such provisions create extra
legal work that the attorneys for the doctor (or her insurer) must do in advance,
and these might not be easy choices to make. They could be straightforward if
the doctor practices in a state whose laws favor the medical profession, but if
she does not practice in such a state and the contract includes a provision that
another state's law should govern, that may be confusing for everyone
involved. It may even strike the patient as somewhat suspicious. A related
concern is the information provided to a patient; most patients in general, and
certainly most ART patients, do not bring their lawyers with them to the
doctor's office. Any extra-legal language may make the patient nervous, and
anything unexpected could exacerbate those nerves. Finally, as with any
"adhesion contract," where the parties cannot bargain for the choice of law,
there is the concern that the choice of law provision might not even be
upheld.6 19

The choice of law solution has the potential to work particularly well in
surrogacy contracts, where there is a clear contractual relationship that can be
established between the parties. It would be trickier, though possible, to include
choice of law provisions in the quasi-contractual forms that people who are
going through ART often complete in their doctor's office.62 0
In place of including a specific choice of law provision, the contract could
more accurately and informatively spell out the rights of the parties involved, at
least describing the laws that exist in the state where the procedure is being
done. However, if a suit is eventually brought in another jurisdiction, that other
forum may choose to use its own law rather than the rules spelled out in the
contract, thus creating more confusion for everyone involved.
III. STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: A GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST SOLUTION FOR

618. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Adams, 551 N.E.2d 635, 637, 639 (Ill. 1990).
619. See, e.g., Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd, 221 F.2d 189, 193-95 (2d Cir.
1955). In the area of jurisdiction, there is the same concern. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines,
Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
620. See KINDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 62, at 313-17 for a discussion of fertility

center contracts and forms.
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The traditional approaches to conflicts of law are grounded in a notion of
territoriality. It is important to understand where an event occurred and where
the parties rights "vested" because it is that location that is said to have the
power of having its law apply. The difficulty with this approach in the realm of
ART is that it is not always possible to determine what the critical event is that
gave rise to the lawsuit, and even if that is possible to determine, it is not
always possible to pinpoint where it occurred.
The First and Second Restatements share the same problems. It is difficult
in both to assess some critical issues when analyzing an ART case, for
example:
* Where is the "domicile" of an embryo?
" Where is place of injury? Of negligence?
* How are ART cases to be characterized? Are embryo cases
"torts" or "property?" Is a case about surrogacy one of contract or
family law?
These questions are possible to answer, but ensuring that all courts answer
them uniformly would require additional components to the approaches that
they do not presently have.
The better law approach is criticized for being inconsistent, unpredictable,
giving too much power to judges, and fostering forum shopping (since a court
is most likely to apply its own law). 621' As far as research indicates, this
approach has not been used yet to resolve a conflicts of law issue involving
ART.
An interesting-though controversial and potentially problematic-idea is
to have courts faced with an ART case use the better law approach. Here, there
is not the same need to determine where the parties rights vested nor is it
necessary to assess any of the other myriad factors required by the Second
Restatement. Under this approach, a court would be free to determine which
law was "better." However, in other areas of law there are concerns that this
approach substitutes judges for lawyers and improperly allocates quasilegislative power to the courts; these concerns would be magnified in an area as
loaded with religious, ethical, and emotional issues as ART.622 It is hard to
imagine a court in Alabama deciding that its surrogacy law was worse than the
surrogacy law in Vermont and thus using the other state's law. Thus, it is far
more likely that here, as in the better law approach generally, courts would tend
to use forum law to decide most conflicts, which would at least be predictable
pre-litigation but would no doubt lead to forum shopping and potentially unfair
results.

621. Note that Leflar himself realized that a forum would most likely choose its own
law: "[t]he idea that the forum's own law is the best in the world ... is unfortunately but
understandably still current among some members of our high courts." Leflar, ChoiceInfluencing Considerationsin Conflicts Law, supra note 450, at 298.

622. The same reasons for why it is difficult to create uniformity apply here as well.
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Of the four, the governmental interest approach is quite possibly the best
solution to ART conflicts. It is precisely this last issue discussed above-the
state's strong interest in developing its own laws about such important and
difficult family law issues-that makes the interest analysis the best of the
modern approaches. Recall that the idea behind this approach is that the court
should choose the law of the state that has a real interest in the case, thus
eliminating many cases that seem to pose a conflict because there are
connections to many states but really do not. With ART cases, the idea that a
state can evaluate the laws themselves and determine if they are meant to apply
will actually mean that different laws will be considered, but only laws that are
meant to apply to that particular factual situation will be used.
This approach is not without critics; the concerns raised are that it is
inconsistent and that it may give too much weight to forum law. 62 3 Moreover,
many teachers of this subject find it difficult to explain to students how the
canon of simply reevaluating a state's own interest is a satisfactory way of
resolving a true conflict. It may be best to say that in a true conflict situation, a
court should make the effort to determine which state has the greater interest in
the case by looking at the laws of that state and determining if those laws are
really meant to apply to this type of factual situation.624
Of course, suggesting the use of the governmental interest approach for
ART cases assumes the possibility that a court may pick and choose a choice of
law approach depending on the case at hand. Obviously, the criticism of such
an idea is that it is confusing for courts and litigants. However, even this kind
of subject-based, seemingly piecemeal approach, is better than the different
approaches used by different states, and would provide more certainty-at least
in this particular area of law.
CONCLUSION

Despite the passage of the Model Act, ART issues will continue to
become more and more complicated as the new technologies continue to
develop, become more widely used, and become more widely used across state
lines. The need for clear legislative guidance is apparent, and alongside that,
the courts need to review and reconsider how they approach interstate cases
themselves.
The field of Conflicts of Law inspired two great legal thinkersseparately-to write poetry about its complexity. To their efforts, this author

623. Note that Currie himself also realized that the approach created two categories
where forum law would, or should, be chosen: "Currie had shown how to identify and
resolve false conflicts. But his true conflicts and unprovided-for cases presented problems he
believed could not be solved. For both these intractable kinds of conflicts he suggested as a
default position that the forum fall back on its own law." Louise Weinberg, Theory Wars in
the Conflict of Laws, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1631, 1643 (2005) (reviewing SYMEON C.
SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE OF LAW REVOLUTION IN THE COURTS: TODAY AND

TOMORROW (2005)).
624. This is different from solving a true conflict merely by applying forum law.
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adds her addition to the poem considering the particular problems created by
ART.
CONFLICT OF LAWS
FIRST VERSE (1914)625
CONFLICT OF LAWS with its peppery seasoning,
Of pliable, scarcely reliable reasoning,
Dealing with weird and impossible things,
Such as marriage and domicil, bastards and kings,
All about courts without jurisdiction,
Handing out misery, pain and affliction,
Making defendant, for reasons confusing,
Unfounded, ill-grounded, but always amusing
Liable one place but not in another
Son of his father, but not of his mother,
Married in Sweden, but only a lover in
Pious dominions of Great Britain's sovereign.
Blithely upsetting all we've been taught,
Rendering futile our methods of thought,
Till Reason, tottering down from her throne,
And Common Sense, sitting, neglected, alone,
Cry out despairingly, "Why do you hate us?
Give us once more our legitimate status."
Ah, Students, bewildered, don't grasp at such straws,
But join in the chorus of Conflict of Laws.
Chorus

625. James A. McLaughlin, the Robert L. Shuman Professor of Law at West Virginia
University College of Law wrote in a 1991 law review article: "[t]he late Thurman Arnold,
one of the more iconoclastic of the legal realists (he wrote The Folklore of Capitalism (1937)
and The Symbols of Government (1935), but who, after a stint in Academia as Dean at West
Virginia University College of Law, Professor at Yale Law School, and judge on the federal
bench, founded the Washington law firm of Arnold, Fortas and Porter) waxed poetic when it
came to Conflict of Laws as dished up by Joseph Beale (at Harvard law school). In Arnold's
autobiography, Fair Fights and Foul, A Dissenting Lawyer's Life (1965), he remembers a
poem written at the Harvard Law School in 1914, to which I have added a second verse,
hopefully in something of the spirit of Arnold's original. Here is Arnold's doggerel with my
addition." James Audley McLaughlin, Conflict of Laws: The New Approach to Choice of
Law: Justice in Search of Certainty Part Two, 94 W. VA. L. R. 73,108 n.65 (1991). The first
two verses-Arnold's and McLaughlin's-were cited by Judge Raker of the Maryland Court
of Appeals court when he dissented in American Motorists Insurance Co. v. ARTRA Group,
Inc. noting that "[tioday, the majority fails to shed new 'light' on the murky maze of Conflict
of Laws." 659 A.2d 1295, 1313 (Md. 1995).
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Beale, Beale, wonderful Beale,
Not even in verse can we tell how we feel,
When our efforts so strenuous,
To over-throw,
Your reasoning tenuous,
Simply won't go.
For the law is a system of wheels within wheels
Invented by Sayres and Thayers and Beales
With each little wheel so exactly adjusted,
That if it goes haywire the whole thing is busted.
So Hail to Profanity, Goodbye to Sanity,
Lost if you stop to consider or pause,
On with the frantic, romantic, pedantic, effusive, abusive, illusive,
conclusive,
Evasive, persuasive Conflict of Laws.626

SECOND VERSE (1991)627
If Arnold thought reason had gone from its throne
Clear back in '14, 0 now how he'd groan
For Babcock and Jackson had a terrible row
And seeds of new policy surely did sow.
The seeds were from plants nursed in academia's groves
And from '20 to '60 grew in great droves;
But, once out of the classroom and into the courts
The profuse little seedlings grew into sports.
Though the new growth was reason supplanting mere rites
When growing in Academe's neat little sites;
In real rows the neat rows fit nothing quite right,
And we often get darkness instead of new light.
But if light be our metaphor, mixed as it is,
Old light was dimmer and fuzzy as fizz;
Nothing it showed but shadow to fools
Who mistake simple outlines for the sureness of rules.
Now New light makes "sense" always the goal

626. THuRMAN ARNOLD, FAIR FIGHTs AND FOUL 21-22 (1965), cited in James A.
McLaughlin, Conflict of Laws: The New Approach to Choice of Laws: Justice in Search of
Certainty, Part Two, 94 W. VA. L. REv. 73, 108 n.65 (1991).
627. This was added by Professor McLaughlin. See, id.
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And explores each case nuance with the Restated tools
So, Lawyers, relax, break up the old straws,
And join in the chorus of Conflict of Laws.
THIRD VERSE (2008)628
Now in the "oughts" we have troubles galoreAs each new procedure has conflicts in store.
Restatements pervasive but reason long gone,
As courts cry for guidance and find there is none.
"Born" to a father, a child of two mothers,
With surrogate sisters and twins who're not brothers;
California'd reverse but New York would affirm
A suit against posthumous donors of sperm.
We've redefined meanings of "person" and "parent"
With "interstate intercourse" nothing's apparent.
Despite Model Acts made to make it all fine,
An embryo's cells can now cross a state line.
So we ask for more "light" on the Restated rules
Shine upon petri dish, medical tools;
Help unconfuse what was once elemental
And judges might find what is truly "parental."
As humans, in hope, employ ART,
Let resolution be bright as can be.
So parents and children will not have a cause
To join in the chorus of Conflict of Laws.

628. The author has humbly added this for consideration.
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